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MY FATHER IS A WOMAN, OH NO!: THE FAILURE
OF THE COURTS TO UPHOLD INDIVIDUAL
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS FOR
TRANSGENDER PARENTS UNDER THE GUISE OF
THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
Helen Y. Chang*
I. INTRODUCTION
My father wants me to call him "Aunt Sharon"' because he
plans to become a woman. 2 Is he still my "father?" Or do I now
* Visiting Professor of Law and Interim Director LL.M Tax Program, Golden
Gate University School of Law; J.D. Southern Methodist University 1985, B.A. Uni-
versity of Texas 1982. My thanks to Bernice Felicia Loui for being the inspiration
behind this article and supporting me throughout this effort. My gratitude and ap-
preciation to Michael Zamperini whose opinions, edits, and insight were always on
target. 1 owe much to two exceptional colleages: Michele Anglade and Janice Kosel,
whose friendship and support are greatly valued. Many thanks are owed to three
wonderful research assistants: Riley Morgan, Nick Urick, and Johanna Atienza who
sacrificed much time to complete this project. I also thank Dean Peter Keane and
Sompong Sucharitkul for providing me with so many opportunities. To Sonya Hol-
lenbeck and Cheryl Barnes: thank you for your friendship and for being exactly
who you are. To my children Katie and Jackson: you are the greatest joys in my life.
Finally, I thank my husband David for listening to my random thoughts at two in
the morning, for responding with coherent replies, for his time in reviewing this
article, and for his love and support.
1. In I.L.S. v. D.K.S., 943 S.W.2d 766, 769 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997), the parents were
married on March 19, 1983, and had two sons. Throughout the marriage, the father
(referred to as "D.K.S." in the opinion) struggled with the urge to cross-dress. The
parties separated in 1992, with D.K.S. participating in a "Real Life Test" in which he
lived as a woman twenty-four hours a day for one year. See id. The father drafted a
separation agreement specifying that the mother would have sole custody over the
children for the one-year period and that he would refrain from visiting the chil-
dren during the "Real Life Test." D.K.S. did not seek a divorce from the mother.
Instead, D.K.S. proposed that the parties remain married and that the boys call him
"Aunt Sharon." In 1993, the mother filed for divorce in Missouri. See id. at 770.
2. Sex reassignment surgery is the irrevocable and often final step in a gender
transition. Surgical alteration of genitalia has existed for thousands of centuries dat-
ing back to the forced removal of male testicles to "domesticate" males as
"eunuchs." In the early part of the twentieth century, following animal experimen-
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tation, individuals sought out physicians who would alter their genitalia in order to
change their sex. In 1917, Dr. Alberta Lucille Hart underwent a hysterectomy, as
well as a change of clothing, hairstyle, and name and lived out the rest of his life as
Dr. Alan Lucill Hart. As plastic surgery techniques improved, physicians began to
perform genital transformations where they did not completely remove genitalia
but instead, cosmetically altered them. In 1931, at Magnus Hirschfeld's Institute for
Sexual Science in Berlin, Dorchen Richter was one of the first individuals to have
transformative sex reassignment surgery. In this surgery, her penis was amputated
and a vagina was created. As researchers made advances in endocrinology indi-
viduals were able to transform, not only their genitalia, but also their secondary sex
characteristics by taking hormones. See Lynn Conway, Sex Reassignment Surgery
(Male to Female): Historical Notes, Descriptions, Photos, References and Links, at
http://ai.eecs.umich.edu/people/conway/TS/SRSlink.htm (quoting Dennis E.
Baron, Grammar and Gender, Yale Univ Pr., Reproduction edition (August 1987)).
One of the most celebrated cases is that of Christine Jorgensen. Following a few
years of hormone injections and pills, Christine Jorgensen (born George) underwent
sex reassignment surgery in Denmark in 1951. Her surgery first consisted of re-
moving male organs and, after a period of healing, surgical construction of a vagina
using skin grafts from her thighs. See id.
Today, sex reassignment surgery follows the work of Dr. Harry Benjamin, an endo-
crinologist, who was the first physician to distinguish sexual orientation from
transgenderism, and Dr. Georges Burou, who invented the modern form of penile
inversion for male-to-female surgeries. Instead of skin grafts from the thighs and
buttocks for the vaginoplasty, Dr. Burou's technique uses the sensitive male genita-
lia tissue to retain sensation. See id.
The reference of post-operative individuals as "male-to-female," "MTF," "female-
to-male," or "FTM" is indicative of the binary classification of gender in our society.
In fact, the English language has not always been gender-specific.
In 1789, William H. Marshall records the existence of a dialectal English
epicene pronoun [a pronoun having one form to represent either sex], sin-
gular ou: 'Ou will' expresses either he will, she will, or it will. Marshall
traces 'ou' to Middle English epicene a, used by the fourteenth-century
English writer John of Trevisa, and both the Oxford English Dictionary
and Wright's English Dialect Dictionary confirm the use of 'a' for he, she,
it, they, and even I. The dialectal epicene pronoun 'a' is a reduced form of
the Old and Middle English masculine and feminine pronouns he and heo.
By the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the masculine and feminine pro-
nouns had developed to a point where, according to the OED, they were
'almost or wholly indistinguishable in pronunciation.' The modern femi-
nine pronoun she, which first appears in the mid twelfth century, seems to
have been drafted at least in part to reduce the increasing ambiguity of the
pronoun system.
John Williams, Gender-Neutral Pronoun FAQ, at
http://www.aetherlumina.com/gnp/ (last modified Feb. 17, 2003) (quoting Dennis
Baron, Grammar and Gender).
Other languages, however, continue to use epicene pronouns. In Finnish, the gen-
der-neutral third-person personal pronoun "han" can mean either "he" or "she,"
and it is used to refer to persons, unlike "se," which is used to refer to inanimate
object and translates to the English as "it." See Ted Schuerzinger, Gender-Specific and
Gender-Neutral Pronouns, LINGUIST List 4.982, at
http://www.linguistlist.org/issues/4/4-982.html#1 (last modified Nov. 23, 1993).
In Farsi, there is a similar distinction between the animate "u" and inanimate, but
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have two "mothers?"
The Missouri Court of Appeals answered both of these
questions in the negative by denying "Aunt Sharon" custody of
her two sons.3 Under the guise of the "best interest of the child,"4
courts have denied biological and legal parents both custody
and visitation rights over their children because these parents
were either in the process of changing, or had completed a
change, in their sexual and/or gender identity.5 One court has
even terminated the parent-child relationship because of a par-
ent's transgender status.6 This article proposes that a parent's
transgender status does not render that parent per se unfit for
custody and/or visitation. Rather, a parent's gender change
should be used as merely one factor within the nexus test used
by the court for creating a custody and visitation arrangement
that is in the best interest of the child.
Part II introduces an overview of the legal issues facing
transgender individuals and specifically identifies the problems
encountered in child custody cases.7 Several transgender case
examples are also discussed in the overview. Part III examines
the historical development of the "best interest of the child"
standard, as well as the de-evolution of gender preference in
child custody cases.8 Part IV critiques the Anglo-American cul-
tural bias in favor of binary genderism and distinguishes the
terms sex, gender, and sexual orientation.9 Although medical
and scientific data prove that sexual identity, gender identity,
and sexual orientation are separate but related, categories, the
law remains behind in its recognition of this data.10 Part IV
demonstrates the historical acceptance of gender multiplicity in
other cultures, such as India, the Dominican Republic, and the
Native American Indian culture, and discusses several interna-
tional cases involving transgender rights."1
Part V analyzes judicial decisions denying custody to trans-
there is no gender differentiation. See id.
3. J.L.S. v. D.K.S., 943 S.W.2d 766, 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
4. The "best interest of the child" standard developed as a gender-neutral
standard for child custody cases. See discussion infra Part III.A.
5. See discussion infra Part V.
6. See Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56, 57 (Nev. 1986).
7. See infra Part II.
8. See discussion infra Part III.A.
9. See discussion infra Part IV.
10. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1-3.
11. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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gender parents and proposes that a parent's transgender status
should not operate as a per se bar to an award of child custody.12
Part V also analyzes judicial decisions that have used the nexus
test to award custody to gay, lesbian, and transgender parents.13
Part VI discusses the evolving social acceptance of transgender
parents and presents data relating to the emotional well-being of
their children.14 This article concludes that courts should not
deny a transgender parent custody of his or her children absent
evidence of that parent's unfitness. 5
II. RECENT CASES AND THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW
Although courts have had infrequent opportunities to
decide transgender legal issues, recent cases have received much
media attention. On January 22, 2002, Court TV aired live on na-
tional television the child custody battle between he pay ali-
mony and child support. 6 The Kantaras case is unprecedented
in Florida because Michael Kantaras was born female.17 Linda
Kantaras argued that Michael cannot be a "father" since he is not
legally a male.' 8 Ironically, Linda wanted Michael to act like a
father, requesting that he pay alimony and child support.' 9 Ac-
cording to Linda, Michael is male enough to pay the support re-
lated to his being a parent and spouse, but not male enough to
qualify as a father or a husband.
On February 21, 2003, over one year after the conclusion
of the three week trial, Judge O'Brien of Florida's Sixth Judicial
12. See discussion infra Part V.A.
13. See discussion infra Part V.B.
14. See discussion infra Part VI.
15. See discussion infra Part VII.
16. See Dana Canedy, Sex Change Complicates Custody: Gender Identity Plays a
Role in Battle for Children in Florida, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 18, 2002, at A8.
17. See id. See also Dana Canedy, Sex Change Complicates Custody: Gender Identity
Plays a Role in Battle for Children in Florida, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 18, 2002, at A8.
18. At the time of the Kantaras marriage, Florida did not permit gender
changes on birth certificates. See Press Release, National Transgender Advocacy
Coalition, Florida Quietly Changes Birth Certificate Policy, at
http://www.ntac.org/pr/ Oune 29, 2002). Many states today allow individuals to
petition for a new and amended birth certificate. See Shana Brown, Sex Changes and
"Opposite-Sex" Marriage: Applying tie Full Faith and Credit Clause to Compel Interstate
Recognition of Transgendered Persons' Amended Legal Sex for Marital Purposes, 38 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1113, 1130-32 (2001).
19. See Canedy, supra note 16, at A8.
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Circuit issued his final decision.20 In his 809 page opinion, Judge
O'Brien reviewed the "medical history of transsexualism," and
cases addressing the validity of marriages entered into with
transgendered individuals. 21 After a lengthy review of the trial
testimony, in a decision heralded by transgender activists, the
court validated the marriage between Michael and Linda Kanta-
ras, 22 and awarded primary residential custody for both children
to Michael Kantaras. 23
Recent media attention has also focused on cases unrelated
to child custody matters involving transgender individuals. In
1999, a California high school teacher was fired for "unfitness for
service" after notifying school employees and students about her
transition from a man to a woman.24 Dana Rivers, formerly
David Warfield, had taught history and journalism at Center
High School in Antelope, California, since 1990.25 She had been
regarded as a stellar teacher and had consistently received excel-
lent evaluations for her teaching.26 Ms. Rivers challenged the
termination as discriminatory and as a violation of her First
Amendment right of free speech.27 Last year, Legal Director of
the National Center for Lesbian Rights, Shannon Minter, re-
ported that the case had settled.28
In 2002, the Kansas Supreme Court voided a marriage be-
tween J'Noel Gardiner and decedent Marshall Gardiner because
J'Noel had been born male.29 The court's decision precluded
J'Noel from inheriting an intestate share of Marshall's estate as
the surviving spouse. 30 Although J'Noel had legally changed
her name and her gender on her birth certificate, the court re-
20. Judge Grants Custody to Transsexual Man, available at
http:/ / www.cnn.com/ 2003/ US/South/02/21/legal.transgender.ap/index.h.
21. In Re Marriage of Kantaras, Case No. 98-5375CA, February 21, 2003 Opin-
ion, available at http: www.courttv.com/trials/kantaras.
22. Id. at 808.
23. Id.
24. Robert Kim, Transgender Teacher Comes Under Fire, ACLU NEWS, Vol. LXIV,
No. 3, May/June 2000, available at http://www.aclunc.org/aclunews/news-
32000.html; Walt Wiley, Teacher at Center Notified of Firing: In Transition from Man to
Woman, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 28, 1999, at B1.
25. See Wiley, supra note 24.
26. See Kim, supra note 24.
27. See id. See also Wiley, supra note 24.
28. Shannon Minter, Address to Santa Clara University School of Law (Apr. 8,
2002).
29. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 136-37 (Kan. 2002).
30. See id. at 137.
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fused to recognize her as a woman for purposes of intestate suc-
cession.31 The Kansas court thus essentially erased J'Noel's legal
existence as Marshall's wife.
A similar result was reached by the Texas Court of Appeals
in Littleton v. Prange.32 Christie Lee Cavazos was born male, but
underwent years of psychological and physical treatment to
complete her gender transition to become female.33 In 1989, she
married Jonathon Mark Littleton.34 When Jonathon died in 1996,
Christie sued for wrongful death as his surviving spouse.35 The
defendant physician moved for summary judgment, asserting
that Christie was a man and therefore, could not be the surviv-
ing spouse of another man.36 The Texas court refused to legally
recognize Christie's gender change stating, "[a]s a matter of
law... Christie Littleton is a male." 37 Since Christie could not
legally be married to another male, the court invalidated her
marriage; thus, Christie lacked the requisite standing to bring an
action as Jonathon's surviving spouse.38 Through this decision,
the Texas court created a legal void for transgender individuals.
Christie legally exists as a female on her birth certificate but
could never be recognized as a woman for purposes of marriage.
These decisions leave transgender individuals with incomplete
rights in a broad array of legal situations39 including child cus-
tody.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." 40 This due process right includes a substantive
component that "provides heightened protection against gov-
ernment interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty
interests." 41 One of the oldest fundamental liberty interests rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court is the interest of parents in the
31. Ironically, the court legally permitted a change of sex on J'Noel's birth cer-
tificate but then refused to recognize that change for purposes of marriage. See id.
at 22.
32. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 872 (2000).
33. See id. at 224.
34. See id. at 225.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 231.
38. See id.
39. See discussion infra Part IlI.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
41. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
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care, custody, and control of their children.42 The 'liberty' spe-
cially protected by the due process clause includes the right to
direct the education and upbringing of one's children.43 The
United States Supreme Court has upheld parents' constitutional
rights to custody of their children against third parties such as
grandparents 44 and has applied this right to uphold parents'
choice to send their children to private school. 45 Since the rela-
tionship of parents to their children is a fundamental constitu-
tionally protected right,46 state courts have held that "the full
panoply of procedural safeguards must be applied to child dep-
rivation hearings." 47
The fundamental right to raise children recognizes three
distinct interests: (1) the parents' interest in experiencing the joy
and pain of child rearing; (2) the child's interest in being sup-
ported and nurtured by those most likely to love the child un-
conditionally; and, (3) the state's interest in promoting a diverse
and pluralistic society.48 When courts substitute their own
moral standards for these interests, 49 all three interests are at
risk. The child risks the loss of a parent who potentially under-
stands the child's needs best. The parent loses the experience of
nurturing a child. Society risks the "standardization" of chil-
dren,50 losing societal diversity and plurality.
In Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and
42. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
43. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
44. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
45. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.
46. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.
47. In re Chad S., 580 P. 2d 983, 985 (Okla. 1978) (reversing the trial court's deci-
sion to terminate a mother's parental rights because she had not been informed of
her right to court-appointed counsel). "The Supreme Court of the United States
holds the relationship of parents to their children to be a fundamental constitution-
ally protected right." Id.
48. See Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family VII. The
Parent-Child Relationship, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1350 (1980).
49. See Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891, 893-94 (S.D. 1992), in which the
South Dakota Supreme Court denied visitation rights to a lesbian mother.
Lesbian mother has harmed these children forever. To give her rights of
reasonable visitation so that she can teach them to be homosexuals, would
be the zenith of poor judgment for the judiciary of this state. Until such
time that she can establish, after years of therapy and demonstrated con-
duct, that she is no longer a lesbian living a life of abomination (see Leviti-
cus 18:22), she should be totally estopped from contaminating these
children.
Id. at 896 (Henderson, J., concurring as to denial of visitation).
50. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
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Mary, the United States Supreme Court invalidated an Oregon
law requiring parents to send their children to public schools be-
cause the Court feared the "standardization" of children.51 The
Supreme Court expressly recognized "the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children"5 2
because parents hold both the right and the duty to ensure the
well-being of their children. That right is lost when a court in-
terjects prejudice and misunderstanding in family custody deci-
sions.
III. THE DE-EVOLUTION OF GENDER
PREFERENCE IN CHILD CUSTODY
A. The Historical Development of the Best Interest of the Child
Standard
The "best interest of the child" standard is a twentieth cen-
tury legal construct intended as a gender-neutral standard for
determining child custody.53 Historically, under Roman law and
the common law of England, the father retained the presumptive
right of child custody.54 Despite this strong presumption in fa-
vor of the father under the common law, the English Chancery
Court had the equitable authority to award custody contrary to
this paternal presumption.55 Early American colonists continued
this paternal presumption from the common law in part because
of women's inferior status under the law, but also because of the
assumption that men were better able to financially provide for
51.
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Un-
ion repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its chil-
dren by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and di-
rect his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations.
Id. at 535.
52. Id. at 534.
53. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES, § 20.1 at 495-98 (2d ed. 1987). See also Michael Grossberg, Balancing
Acts: Crisis, Change, and Continuity in American Family Law, 1890-1990, 28 IND. L.
REV. 273, 296-307 (1995).
54. See Shannon Dean Sexton, A Custody System Free of Gender Preferences and
Consistent with the Best Interests of the Child: Suggestions for a More Protective and Equi-
table Custody System, 88 KY. L.J. 761, 765 n.25 (1999-2000) (citing MARILYN LITTLE,
FAMILY BREAKUP: UNDERSTANDING MARITAL PROBLEMS AND THE MEDIATING OF
CHILD CUSTODY DECISIONS 4-5 (1982)).
55. See id. at 765.
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the child.56
By the late nineteenth century, this paternal presumption
shifted to a maternal presumption.57 The Industrial Revolution
of the nineteenth century changed the previous agricultural-
based economy to one in which fathers left the farm to find work
in urban areas, leaving mothers at home to care for the chil-
dren.58 The mother's role was seen as especially important for
the development of very young children. 59 Courts began to fol-
low the "tender years doctrine," which presumed that the
mother was the better parent to raise a child under the age of
four or five.60 Fathers still retained the right to re-gain custody
after the child passed beyond those "tender years." 61 With the
growing acceptance of psychological data and the increasing
strength of the women's movement, the tender years doctrine
eventually eroded and evolved into a maternal presumption for
child custody. 62  The resulting maternal presumption only
served to shift the gender bias in child custody cases from favor-
ing men to favoring women.
Ironically, the women's rights movement of the nineteenth
century found new meaning for fathers' rights in the twentieth
century.63 Several factors contributed to the new fathers' rights
movement. More women sought employment outside the
home, more spouses were divorced, and more states adopted
no-fault divorce.64 The fathers' rights movement generated leg-
islative changes toward a gender-neutral standard for child cus-
tody awards. 65 Joint custody became the goal, with the courts
focusing on what is in the "best interest of the child."
The best interest of the child standard 66 is the prevalent test
56. See id.
57. See Gerald W. Hardcastle, Joint Custody: A Family Court Judge's Perspective,
32 FAM. L.Q. 201, 202 (1998).
58. See Constance R. Ahrons, Joint Custody Arrangements in the Postdivorce Fam-
ily, 3 J. DIVORCE 189, 189 (1980).
59. See generally Stephen P. Herman, Child Custody Evaluations and the Need for
Standards of Care and Peer Review, 1 J. OF THE CENTER FOR CHILD. & THE CTS. 139
(1999).
60. See Jo-Ellen Paradise, The Disparity Between Men and Women in Custody Dis-
putes: Is Joint Custody the Answer to Everyone's Problems?, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 517,
526-27 (1998).
61. See Sexton, supra note 54, at 767.
62. See id. at 768.
63. See Hardcastle, supra note 57, at 203.
64. See id.
65. See Grossberg, supra note 53, at 296-307.
66. See Finlay v. Finlay, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y. 1925) (articulating the "best in-
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used in the courts today.67 When parents dissolve their marriage
or terminate their relationship, the parents' constitutional family
interests become subordinate to a judicial determination of the
child's best interest to reach a decision for an award of legal
and/or physical custody.68 Although the courts consider many
factors in deciding the type of custody arrangement that is in the
"best interest of the child," the central focus is the respective
parents' ability to meet the child's educational, emotional, and
medical needs.69 This catch-all category 70 allows the court to ex-
ercise broad discretion in deciding what is in the "best interest"
of the child.71
When faced with the issue of child custody, the courts often
interpret the "best interest of the child" standard in a way that
perpetuates a homogenous view of what a mother, father, and
family should look like.72 Courts consider a wide variety of fac-
tors in determining what is actually in the best interest of the
child.73 Through the exercise of broad discretion in custody
terest of the child" standard). Commentators of cite Finlay as the first case to articu-
late this standard. However, the 1902 decision of Crater v. Crater, 67 P. 1049, 1050
(Cal. 1902), actually coins the term and predates Finlay.
67. See Crater, 67 P. at 1050; Taber v. Taber, 290 P. 36, 37 (Cal. 1930); Prouty v.
Prouty, 105 P.2d 295, 298 (Cal. 1940); Munson v. Munson, 166 P.2d 268, 272 (Cal.
1946); S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. 1987); Ellerbe v. Hooks, 416 A.2d 512,
513 (Pa. 1980) (overruling the "tender years doctrine," but applying the "best inter-
est of the child" standard nonetheless); Rowsey v. Rowsey, 329 S.E.2d 57 (W. Va.
1985); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1999); MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (West 2001);
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West 1994); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602 (West 2001);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.375 (West 2001).
68. See David M. Rosenblum, Custody Rights of Gay and Lesbian Parents, 36 VILL.
L. REV. 1665, 1665-66 (1991).
69. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602 (West 2001); In re Marriage of Burham,
283 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa 1979). See also Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31, 35 (Pa. 1992) ("The
standard 'best interest of the child' requires us to consider the full panoply of a
child's physical, emotional, and spiritual well-being.").
70. See Andrea Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and
Other Fictions, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 267, 268-73 (1987). The best interest of the
child standard has been criticized as overly broad and ambiguous. See id.
71. See, e.g., Coulter v. Coulter, 347 P.2d 492, 495 (Colo. 1959) ("[W]e are [al-
ways] reluctant to disturb a ruling of the trial court in custody matters, absent cir-
cumstances clearly disclosing an abuse of discretion."); Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d
52, 55 (Wyo. 1995); Prouty v. Prouty, 105 P.2d 295, 298 (Cal. 1940) (trial courts are
given a very broad discretion in determining the best interest of the child).
72. See Juliet A. Cox, Judicial Enforcement of Moral inperatives: Is tile Best Interest
of the Child Being Sacrificed to Maintain Societal Homogeneity?, 59 MO. L. REV. 775, 781-
83 (1994).
73. See, e.g., Deirdre Larkin Runnette, Judicial Discretion and the Homosexual Par-
ent: How Montana Courts Are and Should Be Considering a Parent's Sexual Orientation in
Contested Custody Cases, 57 MONT. L. REV. 177, 209 (1996).
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cases, some courts have used a parent's transgender status to
preclude an award of custodial rights.74 Although the medical
community has long recognized a multiplicity of sexes, 75 courts
continue to adhere to a rigid and unrealistic view of a sexually
binary human race. 76 Transgenderism 77 should not per se pre-
clude an award of child custody because a legal parent has a
constitutional right78 to maintain a relationship with his or her
79
74. See discussion infra Part V.A.
75. See William A.W. Walters, Transsexualism-Medical and Legal Aspects, 16
AUSTL. J. OF FORENSIC Sci. 65, 69, n.18 (1983); Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes:
Why Male and Female Are Not Enough, THE SCIENCES, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 20-21.
76. Some courts have refused to recognize transgender legal rights because
they do not fall neatly into the binary categories of "male or female." Under the
law, transgender individuals cannot exist. See generally In Marriage of C. and D.
(1979) 35 F.L.R. 340. The Australian court voided a twelve-year marriage because
the husband was intersexed. The court concluded that he was neither male nor fe-
male and, therefore, incapable of a legal marriage. "I am satisfied on the evidence
that the husband was neither man nor woman but was a combination of both, and a
marriage in the true sense of the word... could not have taken place and does not
exist." Id. at 345. See also Leane Renee, Impossible Existence: The Clash of Transsexuals,
Bipolar Categories, and Law, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 343, 345 (1997) ("Transsexuals in
the united states [sic] are legally impossible beings.").
77. "Although transgenderism is often conflated with homosexuality, the char-
acteristic, which defines transgenderism, is not sexual orientation, but sexual identity.
Transgenderism describes people who experience a separation between their gen-
der and their biological/anatomical sex." Mary Coombs, Sexual Dis-Orientation:
Transgendered People and Same-Sex Marriage, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 219, 237 (1998).
78. In a long line of cases, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly con-
firmed parents' constitutional right to direct the upbringing of their children. See,
e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923) (The "liberty" protected by the
Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to "establish a home and bring up
children" and "to control the education of their own."); Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters
of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) ("We
have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and
child is constitutionally protected.").
79. See supra text accompanying note 2. The English language is currently lim-
ited in its binary reference to human beings as either "male" or "female," "him" or
"her," "he" or "she."
I has no gender. Neither does you. He and she definitely have a specific
gender which is very helpful to all of-us-because we doesn't have a
gender either. Does we? Back to he and she or rather to him and to her.
He is masculine except when he is universal and means him and her and
all of - us, who has no gender still. She is feminine, except of course when
she is inanimate, like a ship or a salad, but six of one, half a dozen of the
other, am I right? We still doesn't have a gender. You plural has no gen-
der either. Unlike him and her, they has no gender whatsoever, which I
admit introduces some confusion, but we're almost finished so live with it.
It has no gender at all, except when it refers to an infant about whose gen-
der we are uncertain. Not unlike me. Or you.
KATE BORNSTEIN, Hidden: A Gender, in GENDER OUTLAW 169, 178 (1995).
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child.
Too often, the courts conflate sex, gender, and sexual orien-
tation and then impose a subjective personal moral standard in
making an award of custody.S0 With the growing social con-
sciousness of transgender l individuals in our society,8 2 the
courts cannot continue to use a parent's transgender status as
the basis to deny that parent's fundamental right to raise his or
her legal child without further evidence of that parent's inability
to meet the needs of that child.
80. See G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the
mother's open lesbian relationship merited an award of custody in father's favor);
Daly, 715 P.2d at 63 (Gunderson, J., dissenting). See also Cisek v. Cisek,
No. 80 C. A. 113, 1982 WL 6161, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 20, 1982) (denying visita-
tion rights to a father after he had a complete change of sex). The best interest of
the child standard has been criticized for permitting judicial biases against women,
the poor, and other minority groups. See PHYLLIS CHESLER, MOTHERS ON TRIAL:
THE BATTLE FOR CHILDREN AND CUSTODY 239-68 (1986). See also Nancy D. Polikoff,
IWhy Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody Determina-
tions, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 235, 236-37 (1982).
81. "The word 'transgender' describes much more than crossing between the
poles of masculinity and femininity. It more aptly refers to the transgressing of
gender norms, or being freely gendered, or transcending gender altogether in order
to become more fully human." Holly Boswell, The Transgender Paradigm Shift Toward
Free Expression, in CURRENT CONCEPTS IN TRANSGENDER IDENTITY 55, 56 (Dallas
Denny ed., 1998).
82. Various support groups have formed in the United States. In 1964, philan-
thropist Reed Erickson founded the Erickson Educational Foundation "to provide
assistance and support in areas where human potential was limited by adverse
physical, mental, or social conditions, or where the scope of research was too new,
controversial or imaginative to receive traditionally oriented support." See Reed
Erickson and The Erickson Educational Foundation, available at
http://web.uvic.ca/-erickl23/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2003). The EEF sponsored edu-
cation on transsexualism and funded the medical research of Dr. Harry Benjamin
and the John Hopkins Clinic. Among its many efforts, the EEF sponsored the first
three International Symposia on Gender Identity now known as the HBIGDA Sym-
posia (The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association). See id.
In 1992, Bet Power formed "The East Coast Female-to-Male Group" as a peer sup-
port network. See LESLIE FEINBERG, TRANSGENDER WARRIORS: MAKING HISTORY
FROM JOAN OF ARC TO RU PAUL 171, app. B (Beacon Press 1996). The group meets
monthly in Northampton, Massachusetts. See id.
The Intersex Society of North America is a peer support, education, and advocacy
group based in San Francisco, California. See Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), In-
tersex Society of North America, at http://www.isna.org/faq/index.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 18, 2002). ("ISNA is working to create a world free of shame, secrecy, and
unwanted sexual surgeries for children born with anatomy that someone decided is
not standard male or female."). The International Conference on Transgender Law
and Employment Policy hosts an annual conference in Houston, Texas each sum-
mer to discuss various transgender legal and social policy issues. See FEINBERG, su-
pra, at 172.
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B. Custody Today
When parents of minor children separate and divorce, the
court must determine the custodial rights of the parents.8 3 Four
different types of custodial arrangements exist today: sole cus-
tody, alternating or shared custody, split custody, and joint cus-
tody.8 4 In addition to the issue of child custody, the court also
must determine the visitation rights of the non-custodial par-
ent.8 5 While custody usually is viewed as a privilege, visitation
generally is considered within the rights of a legal parent.86
Under the sole custody system, children live with the cus-
todial parent and the non-custodial parent receives visitation
rights.87  Visitations are typically scheduled for alternating
weekends and may include specific arrangements for holidays
and summer vacations. 88 Under the alternating or shared cus-
tody system, each parent is awarded custody for alternating pe-
riods of the year.8 9 Under the split custody system, the parents
divide or split the children so that each parent obtains custody
over at least one child and the other parent has visitation
rights. 90
Joint custody is the preferred choice in many states today,91
but has diverse interpretations among the states. Joint custody
can mean either legal custody or physical custody.92 Legal cus-
tody means the authority to make major decisions regarding the
child's welfare, such as choice of school. 93 If the court orders
joint legal custody, the parents share equal responsibility for
these decisions, regardless of the child's actual location. 94 Physi-
cal custody refers to the responsibility for the child's everyday
83. See Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations in Divorce Proceedings, 29 FAM.
L.Q. 51, 52 (1995).
84. See Judith Bond Jennison, The Search for Equality in a Woman's World: Fathers'
Rights to Child Custody, 43 RUTGERs L. REV. 1141, 1146-47 (1991).
85. See id.
86. See Lyons v. Lyons, 591 N.E.2d 1006, 1007 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
87. See Sexton, supra note 54, at 771.
88. See id. See also Lyons, 591 N.E.2d at 1007.
89. See Sexton, supra note 54, at 771. See also Arthur M. Berman & David P.
Kirsh, Definitions of Joint Custody, 5 FAM. ADVOC. 2, 2 (1982) [hereinafter Berman].
90. See Berman, supra note 89, at 2.
91. At least firty-five states have codified various types of joint custody stat-
utes. See Margaret M. Barry, The District of Columbia's Joint Custody Presumption:
Misplaced Blame and Simplistic Solutions, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 767, app. A at 825-30
(1997).
92. See Hardcastle, supra note 57, at 204.
93. See id.
94. See Berman, supra note 89, at 2.
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needs.95 Under a joint physical custody arrangement, the child
alternates between parents' homes to ensure "significant" or
"substantial" time with each parent. 96 The distinction between
"joint" custody and "sole" custody is far from clear. In one Cali-
fornia study, researchers concluded that equal sharing of physi-
cal and legal custody occurred in only 20% of "joint custody"
cases. 97 Thus, the true difference between joint custody and sole
custody may be one of semantics.98
Another source of inconsistency in the best interest of the
child standard is that states vary in their views of whether joint
custody is in the best interest of the child. At least one state
maintains that joint custody should be awarded only in extraor-
dinary circumstances. 99 Other states, such as California and
Alabama, presume that joint custody is in the best interest of the
child if the parents agree upon joint custody.100 Since the award
of child custody is based upon the court's determination of what
is in the best interest of the child, the court can scrutinize the
"lifestyle" of a particular parent 01 and can order psychological
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See Marygold S. Melli & Patricia R. Brown, The Economics of Shared Custody:
Developing an Equitable Formula for Dual Residence, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 543, 549 (1994).
98. See Hardcastle, supra note 57, at 208-09.
By and large, men prefer joint custody and overwhelmingly report being
more satisfied with this arrangement than noncustodial fathers report be-
ing satisfied with their arrangement, despite the fact that their
children tend to reside with the mother. For men, joint custody appears to
represent a psychological benefit. Many fathers, for example, perceive that
even joint legal custody, which minimally extends fathers' roles and re-
sponsibilities, apparently gives them control that they otherwise would
not have.
Id. (quoting Joyce A. Arditti & Debra Madden-Derdrich, Joint and Sole Custody Moth-
ers: Implications for Research and Practice, 78 FAM. SOC'Y: L. CONTEMP. HUM. SERVICES
26, 37 (1997)).
99. See Davis v. Davis, 380 N.E.2d 415, 418-19 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (holding that
joint custody should only be awarded in "certain exceptional circumstances" and
should not be imposed where the parents are "severely antagonistic and openly
criticize one another in the child's presence"). See also Braiman v. Braiman, 378
N.E.2d 1019, 1021 (N.Y. 1978) ("As a court-ordered arrangement imposed upon al-
ready embattled and embittered parents, accusing one another of serious vices and
wrongs, [joint custody] can only enhance familial chaos.").
100. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3080 (West 2002); ALA. CODE § 30-3-152 (a) (2002).
101. See Jarrett v. Jarrett. 400 N.E.2d 421, 424 (Ill. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 927,
reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980) (holding that mother's co-habitation with her boy-
friend was damaging to the children's moral welfare and development and against
public policy); DeVita v. DeVita, 366 A.2d 1350, 1354 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1976) (holding that a father's female companion was not permitted to stay over-
night when his children were visiting because "the moral welfare of the children is
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evaluations of the parents10 2 Some courts have used the "best
interest of the child" standard to deny custody and visitation
rights to transgender parents because of their transgender iden-
tity and status.103 Few child custody cases involving transgender
parents have resulted in reported decisions in the United States.
Not surprisingly, the lack of precedent and accurate information
regarding transgenderism has led to harsh results, including the
termination of the parent-child relationship. 104
The best interest of the child is served when the court ac-
cepts that child's reality instead of adhering to an artificial fam-
ily model. As one New Jersey court stated, "[flamilies differ in
both size and shape within and among the many cultural and
socio-economic layers that make up this society. We cannot con-
tinue to pretend that there is one formula, one correct pattern
that should constitute a family in order to achieve the suppor-
tive, loving environment we believe children should inhabit." 05
A per se preclusion of child custody based on a parent's gender
change ignores the reality of that child's life.
III. GENDER MULTIPLICITY: MODERN ANGLO-AMERICAN VERSUS
OTHER CULTURES
A. Modern Anglo-American Cultural Bias in Favor of Binary
Genderism
Modern Anglo-American culture has traditionally merged
the categories of sex, gender, and sexual orientation, with the re-
sult of recognizing only two alternative and exclusive categories:
male and female.1 06 Some scholars have posited that our social
and legal systems have much invested in the conflation of sex,
gender, and sexual orientation.10 7 This Anglo-American limita-
possibly endangered"); Bunim v. Bunim, 83 N.E.2d 848, 849 (N.Y. 1949) (denying
mother custody because of "deliberate adulteries" as "[lit cannot be said that 'the
best interests and welfare' of those impressionable teen-age girls will be 'best
served' by awarding their custody to one who proclaims, and lives by, such ex-
traordinary ideas of right conduct").
102. See CAL. CT. R. 1257.3; FLA. STAT. ch. 61.20(1) (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-
1003 (2001).
103. See J.L.S. v. D.D.S., 943 S.W.2d 766, 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Daly v. Daly,
715 P.2d 56, 57 (Nev. 1986).
104. See Daly, 715 P.2d at 57.
105. In re Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550, 554-55 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1993).
106. See GORDENE O. MACKENZIE, TRANSGENDER NATION 14 (1994).
107. See generally Richard F. Storrow, Naming the Grotesque Body in the Nascent
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tion to only male and female categories for sex, gender, and sex-
ual orientation has been referred to as "the gender box."108 "If
your sex is male, your gender is masculine, and you are sexually
attracted to women. Similarly, if your sex is female, your gender
is feminine, and you are sexually attracted to men." 10 9
Despite the historical, medical, and scientific evidence to the
contrary, the Anglo-American legal system persists in its distor-
tion of sex, gender, and sexual orientation.1 10 Unfortunately, leg-
islators and jurists often confuse and frequently conflate the
definitions for sex, gender, and sexual orientation.' These re-
lated but distinct identities must first be defined and understood
so that courts can make sound and reasoned judicial decisions.112
1. The Identity of Sex in Anglo-American Culture
Legal experts disagree as to the definition of sexual iden-
tity.1 3 Confronted with the issue of sexual identity, some courts
Jurisprudence of Transsexualism, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275 (1997).
108. Jennifer L. Nye, The Gender Box, 13 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 226, 228 (1998).
109. Id. at 228.
110. See generally In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002); Littleton v. Prange, 9
S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
111. See MINN. STAT. § 363.01(41a) (2001) (defining "sexual orientation" as in-
cluding "having or being perceived as having a self-image or identity not tradition-
ally associated with one's biological maleness or femaleness"). See also Mary Anne
C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in
the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1999) (arguing that while
"warding off embarrassment or salacious thoughts in the minds of judges, this in-
terchangeability of the words 'sex' and 'gender' has contributed to some analytic
confusion").
112. See Renee, supra note 76, at 348-49.
Inconsistencies in Britain's laws illustrate how one European legal scheme
erases transsexual reality. When Caroline Cossey, known as the model
'Tula,' had sexual reassignment surgery in 1974, her physical metamor-
phosis from man to woman made her feel simultaneously male, female,
and neither. Her experience under law was similar. Tula's passport states
that she is female, but her birth certificate designates her as male. The Brit-
ish health care system paid for her surgery to construct female genitals,
but if she commits a crime, she will go to a male prison. She pays for
health insurance at the higher rate charged to women, but cannot collect
her pension until she's sixty-five, the age at which men can collect, al-
though women are able to collect at age sixty.
Id. The American system is no different. In the case of J'Noel Gardiner, the Wis-
consin court ordered a new birth certificate for J'Noel to identify her sex as female.
J'Noel's driver's license, passport, and health documents were also changed. But
for purposes of a legal marriage, J'Noel could not be a female. See Gardiner, 42 P.3d
at 123, 135-36.
113. For purposes of a valid marriage, some courts limit an individual's sex to
birth anatomy. See Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 135 ("A male-to-female post-operative trans-
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in the past have categorized an individual's sex as either "male"
or "female" solely in reference to external genitalia present at
birth." 4 This anatomically based definition of sex has social and
legal implications with respect to marriage, 115 medical bene-
fits," 6 inheritance, 1" 7 employment discrimination," 8 imprison-
sexual does not fit the definition of a female. The male organs have been removed,
but the ability to 'produce ova and bear offspring' does not and never did exist.
There is no womb, cervix, or ovaries, nor is there any change in his chromosomes."
(internal citation omitted)); In re Declaratory Relief for Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832
(Ohio Prob. 1987) ("[A] person's sex is determined at birth by an anatomical exami-
nation by the birth attendant."); Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231 ("At the time of birth,
Christie was a male, both anatomically and genetically. The facts contained in the
original birth certificate were true and accurate, and the words contained in the
amended certificate are not binding on this court."). Other courts consider a psy-
chological component in determining sex. Richards v. United States Tennis Ass'n,
400 N.Y.S.2d 267, 272 (Sup. Ct. 1977) ("When an individual such as plaintiff, a suc-
cessful physician, a husband and father, finds it necessary for his own mental sanity
to undergo a sex reassignment, the unfounded fears and misconceptions of defen-
dants must give way to the overwhelming medical evidence that this person is now
female."); M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 209 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1976) (" [F]or marital purposes
if the anatomical or genital features of a genuine transsexual are made to conform
to the person's gender, psyche or psychological sex, then identity by sex must be
governed by the congruence of these standards."), cert. denied, 364 A. 2d 1076 (1976).
See also Re Kevin: Validity of Marriage of Transsexual (2001) 28 Fain. LR *158
(Austl.), available at http://www.familycourt.gov.au/judge/2001/pdf/rekevin.pdf.
For the purpose of ascertaining the validity of a marriage under Australian
law, the question whether a person is a man or a woman is to be deter-
mined as of the date of the marriage.... There is no rule or presumption
that the question whether a person is a man or a woman for the purpose of
marriage law is to be determined by reference to circumstances at the time
of birth.
Id.
114. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Corbett v.
Corbett (otherwise Ashley) (No. 1), [1971] P. 83 (1970), 1970 WL29661; Francisco
Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex,"
"Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV.
1 (1995).
115. See Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 135-36 (voiding a marriage on the grounds that a
biologically born male could never become a "female"). See also Ladrach, 513 N.E.
2d at 832 ("[I]t is this court's opinion that the legislature should change the statutes,
if it is to be the public policy of the state of Ohio to issue marriage licenses to post-
operative transsexuals.... Therefore, the application of Elaine Frances Ladrach to
obtain a marriage license as a female person is denied."); Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 227,
231 ("Once a man, always a man .... As a male, Christie cannot be married to an-
other male.").
116. See generally Davidson v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 420 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup.
Ct. 1979) (finding that sex reassignment surgery was a covered insurance benefit
under private health insurance policy).
117. See generally Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 120; Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 223.
118. See Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Title
VII does not protect transsexuals."). See also Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Holloway has not claimed to have treated dis-
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ment,119 criminal laws, 2 0 and child custody.'2' Moreover, the ju-
diciary's unwillingness to change an individual's sexual identity
on his/her birth certificate precludes any change in that indi-
vidual's sexual identity in the eyes of the law with ensuing con-
sequences. 122
Sexual identity is thought to consist of a variety of factors, 123
including: chromosomes, 124 gonads, 125 internal morphology, 126
external morphology, 127 hormones, 128 phenotype, 129 gender of
rearing,130 gender role,131 and gender identity.132 Medical scien-
criminatorily because she is male or female, but rather because she is a transsexual
who chose to change her sex. This type of claim is not actionable under Title VII
and is certainly not in violation of the doctrines of Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion.").
119. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829-30 (1994) (petitioner who wore
women's clothing, had estrogen therapy, and had silicone breast implants was
placed in an all male prison and was subsequently assaulted and raped); see also
Murray v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, No. 95-5204, slip op. at 1 (6th Cir. Jan. 28,1997).
120. See City of Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522 (I1. 1978) (holding unconsti-
tutional a city ordinance prohibiting cross-dressing).
121. See discussion infra Part IV.
122. See Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 385 (deferring to the Board of Health as the ad-
ministrative body authorized to maintain birth records which had concluded that
"[t]he desire of concealment of a change of sex by the transsexual is outweighed by
the public interest for protection against fraud"); Hartin v. Dir. of Bureau of Re-
cords & Statistics, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) (court refused to change sex
on a post operative male-to-female's birth certificate).
123. See JOHN MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF THE BODY: DILEMMAS, EDUCATION,
COUNSELING 11-12 (1968).
124. The typical chromosomal pattern is either XX for females or XY for males.
See id. at 15-21.
125. Gonads indicate the presence of ovaries or testes. See Ruth Hubbard, Gen-
der and Genitals: Constructs of Sex and Gender, in CURRENT CONCEPTS IN
TRANSGENDER IDENTITY 45 (Dallas Denny ed., Garland Publishing, Inc. 1998).
126. Internal morphology is the presence or absence of male or female internal
structures. See Michael W. Ross, Gender Identity, in TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX
REASSIGNMENT 2, Table 1.1 (William A.W. Walters and Michael W. Ross eds., Ox-
ford University Press 1986).
127. External morphology is in the form of external genitalia. See JOHN MONEY
& ANKE A. EHRHARDT, MAN & WOMAN BOY & GIRL: THE DIFFERENTIATION AND
DIMORPHISM OF GENDER IDENTITY FROM CONCEPTION TO MATURITY 7 (John Hop-
kins University Press 1972).
128. The male hormones are androgens and the female hormones are estrogen
and progesterone. Typically, men and women possess both types of hormones, but
the level of the hormones varies in each individual, thus contributing to the indi-
vidual's sexual identity. See id. at 6-8.
129. Examples of external secondary characteristics associated as male or female
are hair and breasts. See id. at 197.
130. The gender of rearing is the sex role assigned to the individual as a child.
See id. at 12.
131. Gender role refers to behavior that is culturally gender appropriate. See
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tists also recognize that perfect harmony among these factors
does not always exist in human nature.133 Some courts now con-
cede that a person's sex is more complicated than the presence
or absence at birth of a penis or a clitoris.34 Sexual identification
at birth based upon external genitalia is neither final nor definite
because certain internal incongruities and anomalies may not be
visibly apparent at birth.135 One example is Klinefelter Syn-
drome, which affects one in 500 to 1,000 babies identified as
"male" at birth.136 The Syndrome means that the child has two
or more X chromosomes instead of the typical male XY chromo-
some pattern.137 A diagnosis of Klinefelter Syndrome is usually
not made until puberty, when the external manifestations of the
Syndrome first appear.138 In addition to the chromosomal pat-
tern found in individuals with Klinefelter Syndrome, medical re-
searchers have documented other chromosomal patterns,
concluding that there are many viable genetic possibilities (be-
yond XX and XY), including: XXY, XO, XYY, XXYY, and XXX, 13 9
as well as mosaic variations such as X/XY, and XX/XY.140
Hormones can also affect the development of "opposite"
sex characteristics later in an individual's life.141 5-Alpha Reduc-
MILDRED L. BROWN & CHLOE A. ROUNSLEY, TRUE SELVES 21 (Jossey-Bass Publishers
1996).
132. Gender identity is sometimes referred to as psychological identity. See id.
("It is our own deeply held conviction and deeply felt inner awareness that we be-
long to one gender or the other."). See also Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and
Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIz. L. REV. 265,
282-83 (1999).
133. "Biologists and medical scientists recognize, of course, that absolute dimor-
phism is a Platonic ideal not actually achieved in the natural world." Melanie
Blackless et al., How Sexually Dimorphic Are We? Review and Synthesis, 12 AM. J. HUM
BIOLOGY 151 (2000).
134. Richards v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267, 272 (Sup. Ct.
1977); M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 209 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1976).
135. Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia can cause a fetus with the typical female
XX chromosome pattern to develop male-like genitalia. These individuals will
sometimes menstruate through the phallus following puberty. See Kenneth Kipnis
& Milton Diamond, Pediatric Ethics and the Surgical Assignment of Sex, The U.K. In-
tersex Association, at http://www.ukia.co.uk/diamond/ (last visited Oct. 17,
2002). Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome causes fetuses with the typical XY male
chromosome pattern to develop external female genitalia. See id.
136. See ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY 52 (2000).
137. See id.
138. See MONEY, supra note 123, at 17.
139. See Blackless, supra note 133, at 151-52.
140. See MONEY & ERHARDT, supra note 127, at 39.
141. See Jiang-Ning Zhou et al., A Sex Difference in the Human Brain and its Rela-
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tase Deficiency occurs from a disruption of fetal hormonal me-
tabolism.142 5-Alpha Reductase Deficiency is quite common in a
number of populations, including Central America and Vietnam,
affecting more than 100 individuals in a sample of more than
fifty families. 43 Individuals with 5-Alpha Reductase Deficiency
have XY chromosomes and testes but appear phenotypically fe-
male at birth.144 At puberty, the "girl" begins to develop "male"
physical features including a penis.145 Thus, external genitalia at
birth represents only one factor contributing to an individual's
sexual identity.
Despite the existence of multiple chromosomal patterns for
human beings, chromosome testing for determining sex has
been widely used in the sports arena.1 46 Curiously, although
sexual identification at birth is generally based on external geni-
talia, sexual identification of athletes has been based upon
chromosomal structure. In 1968, the International Olympic
Committee began requiring female athletes to undergo a sex
chromatin test to verify their sex.147 "Gender verification" was
in response to "rumors of men masquerading as women and
'women who were not really women' competing in the
Games." 148 The chromatin test, also known as the "Barr body
tion to Transsexuality, 375 NATURE 68, 70 (1995) (medical study showing that gender
identity develops as a result of an interaction between the developing brain and sex
hormones).
142. See Blackless, supra note 133, at 153.
143. See id.
144. See Alice D. DREGER, HERMAPHRODITES AND THE MEDICAL INVENTION OF
SEX 31 (1998).
145. See id. at 121.
146. Until 1999, the International Olympics Committee used various chromo-
some tests to verify the gender of female athletes. See Brendan Pittaway, Olympic
Bosses Suspend Sex Tests, THE EXPRESS (Jul. 10, 1999), at
http://www.pfc.org.uk/news/1999/olympic.htm.
147. The original Olympic Games in ancient Greece were limited to men who
competed in the nude. Women spectators were prohibited. Women began compet-
ing in the Olympics in 1900. As women's sports became increasingly popular, ru-
mors circulated as to the "femininity" of certain athletes. Some female athletes
were required to submit to crude physical and gynecologic examinations as a pre-
requisite to competition. See Mryon Genel, Sport: Gender Verification No More?,
UKPFC-NEWS Archives Apr-June 2000, available at
http://www.pfc.org.uk/pfclists/news-arc/2OOq2/msgOOlO5.htm. See also Pamela
B. Fastiff, Gender Verification Testing: Balancing the Rights of Female Athletes with a
Scandal-Free Olympic Games, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 937, 938 (1992). According to
Mary Peters, Britain's 1972 gold medal Olympic pentathlete, the test was "the most
crude and degrading experience I have ever known." Pittaway, supra note 141.
148. Fastiff, supra note 147, at 938-39 (citing Alison Carlson, When is a Woman Not
a Woman?, WOMEN'S SPORTS & FITNESS, Mar. 1991, at 26). See also Lori Ewing, Gen-
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test," is administered by having the individual rinse her mouth
and then a "sample of cells [is then taken from] the inner lining
of the cheek." 149 The tissue sample is tested for the presence of a
second X chromosome. 150 Due to the existence of genetic chro-
mosome variations, many medical researchers have criticized
the chromatin test as unfair and discriminatory.151 Ironically,
men with Klinefelter's Syndrome with two XX chromosomes,
would pass the Barr body test as a female athlete. 5 2
The limitation of sexual identity based solely on chromo-
somes is illustrated in the exclusion of Spanish athlete Maria
Patino from the 1988 Olympics. 153 Although Ms. Patino identi-
fied herself as a "female" and her external morphological sex
was "female," she had the male chromosomal pattern of XY
known as Androgen Insensitivity.154 Ms. Patino failed the sex
chromatin test and was barred from competition.15s Upon her
return to Spain, Ms. Patino was stripped of her past titles and
evicted from her national athletic residence.156 In addition, her
scholarship was revoked and her boyfriend deserted her. 57 Ms.
Patino challenged the Barr body test and fought the Interna-
tional Olympic Committee's decision. 58 Two and one-half years
later, and thousands of dollars later, she was back on the Span-
ish Olympic squad. 59
Ms. Patino's plight caused the International Amateur Ath-
letic Federation to hold a workshop on Methods of Femininity
Verification in late 1990.160 Although the group recommended
der Testing Unfair, CALGARY HERALD, Jan. 12, 1992, at F6 ("The incidence of men
masquerading as women is negligible.").
149. See Richards, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
150. See id.
151. See Albert de la Chapelle, The Use and Misuse of Sex Chromatin Screening for
Gender Identification of Female Athletes, 256 JAMA 1920, 1920 (1986). See also Richards,
400 N.Y.S.2d at 720. One newspaper reported that the sex chromatin test has an er-
ror rate between six to fifteen percent. See Howard Wolinsky, Olympic Test Deserves
a Gender Rap, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 7, 1988 available at 8/7/88 CHI. SUN-TIMES 14,
1988 WL 4677119.
152. See Genel, supra note 147, at 2. See also De La Chapelle, supra note 151, at
1922.
153. See FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 136, at 1-3.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 136, at 1-3.
159. See id.
160. See Genel, supra note 147, at 3.
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that laboratory-based sex determination be discontinued, the In-
ternational Olympics Committee instead simply replaced the sex
chromatin test with another type of chromosome test.161 In
1991, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) discarded the
sex chromatin test in favor of the Dingeon method or poly-
merase method to test for sexual identity.162 Like the chromatin
test, the Dingeon test samples oral tissue from the individual163
but, instead of testing for the presence of a second X chromo-
some, the Dingeon test looks for the presence of a Y chromo-
some.164 Since the Dingeon test uses chromosomes as the sole
criterion for sexual identity, its substantive limitations are no
different than the chromatin test.165 In 1999, the IOC suspended
gender testing of female athletes for the 2000 Olympics due to
the inherent ambiguities in chromosome testing. 166
The recognition of chromosomal variations lead a New
York court in Richards v. U.S. Tennis Association167 to reject the
use of the Barr body test as the sole means to determine sex for
purposes of participation in the United States Tennis Associa-
tion's tournament.168 Dr. Renee Richards, a post-operative male-
to-female, 169 challenged the validity of the sex chromatin test to
determine her sexual identity as female. Dr. Richards had been
an accomplished tennis player and was ranked thirteenth na-
tionally in the men's 35-and over category.1 70 Following his sex
reassignment surgery, Dr. Richards entered various women's
tennis tournaments, competing successfully in the women's sin-
161. See id.
162. See Paul Holmes, Olympic Chiefs Brush Off Sex Test Storm, THE REUTERS
LIBRARY REPORT, Jan. 29,1992.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See M.A. Ferguson-Srnith, Olympic Row Over Sex Testing, 355 NATURE 10
(Jan. 2, 1992).
166. See Suzanne Miller, Mhen Sexual Development Goes Awry, WORLD & 1, Sept.
2000, at 148, 154.
167. See generally Richards, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 272-73 ("This court is not striking
down the Barr body test, as it appears to be a recognized and acceptable tool for de-
termining sex. However, it is not and should not be the sole criterion, where as
here, the circumstances warrant consideration of other factors.").
168. The court admitted the testimony of medical expert Dr. John Money who
opined that the Barr body test was inadequate to determine sex because "there are
human beings who do not belong to the statistical average with respect to their
chromosome pattern." Id. at 272.
169. Dr. Renee Richards was born as Richard H. Raskind and underwent a sex
reassignment operation at age forty-one because she felt that she was "a woman
trapped inside the body of a man." Id. at 268.
170. See id.
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gles category1 71 After Dr. Richards applied to the U.S. Tennis
Association (USTA) to play in the U.S. Open, the USTA insti-
tuted a requirement that players pass a sex determination test.172
Dr. Richards argued that the test was "insufficient, grossly un-
fair, inaccurate, faulty and inequitable.., for purposes of ex-
cluding individuals from sports events on the basis of
gender."'173
Judge Ascione of the New York Superior Court decided that
the sex chromatin test should not be the sole criterion to deter-
mine sex when circumstances warrant the consideration of other
factors.174 After hearing expert testimony as to the definition of
sexual identity, the court concluded that "the requirement of
[the USTA] that [Dr. Richards] pass the Barr body test in order to
be eligible to participate in the women's singles of the U.S. Open
is grossly unfair, discriminatory and inequitable, and violative of
her rights under the Human Rights Law of this state." 75 Al-
though the court did not invalidate the sex chromatin test, the
court nevertheless reaffirmed Dr. Richards' sexual identity as
female, stating, "When an individual such as [Dr. Richards], a
highly successful physician, a husband and father, finds it neces-
sary for his own mental sanity to undergo a sex reassignment,
the unfounded fears and misconceptions of defendants must
give way to the overwhelming medical evidence that this person
is now female." 176
Other courts have reached similar conclusions, finding that
sexual identity is based on a variety of factors. One of the first
cases to address the issue of sexual identity for purposes of mar-
riage is the landmark English case Corbett v. Corbett.177 In that
171. See id.
172. See Richards, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
The record is clear that USTA's and USOC's decision to require a sex-
determination test for the 1976 U.S. Open, the National Championships,
was a direct result of plaintiffs application to the 1976 U.S. Open, and
plaintiff's frank presentation of her medical situation in a personal letter to
the chairman of the U.S. Open, Mike Blanchard. Until August 1976, there
had been no sex determination test in the 95-year history of the USTA Na-
tional Championships, other than a simple phenotype test (observation of
primary and secondary sexual characteristics).
Id. Dr. Richards later withdrew her application to play in the 1976 U.S. Open.
See id.
173. Id.
174. See id. at 273.
175. Id. at 272 (citation omitted).
176. Id.
177. 1971 P. 83 (Eng.).
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case, the husband petitioned the court to nullify a three-month
marriage on the grounds that his wife was male.178 The husband
was not claiming any fraud since he knew that his wife April
had been born male. The nine medical experts who testified in
the Corbett case all agreed that sex determination is based upon
at least four criteria: (i) chromosomal factors, (ii) gonadal factors,
(iii) genital factors (including internal sex organs), and (iv) psy-
chological factors.179 Despite this expert testimony, Judge Or-
mond concluded "that the biological sexual constitution of an
individual is fixed at birth (at the latest), and cannot be changed,
either by the natural development of organs of the opposite sex,
or by medical or surgical means." 8 0 The court granted the peti-
tion to nullify the marriage.181
The reasoning in Corbett was recently challenged in the Eng-
lish case of Bellinger v. Bellinger.1 82 Elizabeth Ann Bellinger
sought a declaration that her 1981 marriage to Michael Jeffrey
Bellinger was valid under the Family Law Act, notwithstanding
her birth as a male. 183 Elizabeth argued that medical research
post-Corbett established that psychological and hormonal fac-
tors should be included as important criteria in determining an
individual's sexual identity.184 The court refused to depart from
the determination that sex is biologically fixed at birth, although
the court recognized that gender may be impossible to identify
at birth.185 The court believed that social policy required that sex
178. See id. at 88.
179. See id. at 100.
180. Id. at 104.
181. See id. at 108.
182. See Bellinger v. Bellinger, 2002 Fam. 150 (Eng. C.A.).
183. See id. at 155. Elizabeth's petition was supported by her husband Michael
Jeffrey Bellinger. See id. at 151. Elizabeth began dressing and living as a woman in
1971. See id. at 155. She had sex reassignment surgery in 1.981 and then married
Michael who knew about her background. See id.
184. See id. at 152.
In the past 30 years medical knowledge and understanding have devel-
oped to show that psychological and hormonal factors should be included
as additional important criteria in the determination of a person's sex. It is
now known that sexual differentiation occurs in several stages. Transsex-
ualism or gender dysphoria occurs where sex differentiation in the brain
does not match the previous physiological development and, since sex dif-
ferentiation is not complete in the brain until the age of two or three, it is
impossible to identify gender at birth.
Id. Elizabeth also argued that the denial of the right to marry is incompatible
with international human rights laws. See id. at 151.
185. See id. at 160. "It would seem from the definition proposed by Miss Cox,
with which we would not disagree, that it would be impossible to identify gender
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and gender be assigned at birth 86 and that the decision whether
an individual's gender status can legally be changed was best
left to the legislature.18 7
In the case of M.T. v. J.T.,l88 M.T filed a complaint for
spousal support against her estranged husband.18 9 The husband
refused to pay support and sought to nullify the marriage on the
grounds that the plaintiff was male.1 90 Although M.T. had been
born male, she "had always felt that she was [I female." 191 The
New Jersey Superior Court specifically recognized the reasoning
that there are several criteria or standards that may be relevant
in determining the sex of an individual. 1 92
The evidence and authority which we have examined, how-
at the moment of the birth of a child." Id.
186.
We are however concerned with legal recognition of marriage which, like
divorce, is a matter of status and is not for the spouses alone to decide. It
affects society and is a question of public policy. For that reason, even if for
no other reason, marriage is in a special position and is different from the
change of gender on a driving licence, social security payments book and
so on. Birth, adoption, marriage, divorce or nullity and death have to be
registered. Each child born has to be placed into one of two categories for
the purpose of registration. Status is not conferred only by a person upon
himself; it has to be recognised by society.
Id. at 176-77. Dr. John Money was a proponent of the Imprinting Theory of gender
identity. See Kay Brown, TransGender Theory, TRANSHISTORY, at
http://www.transhistory.org/history/TH_.Theory.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2002).
Dr. Money theorized that parents' sexually dimorphic treatment of a child could
imprint an assigned gender identity upon that child. See id. Dr. Money's theories
lead directly to the tragedy and "experiment" of "John/Joan" Theissen whose penis
was accidentally destroyed during circumcision. Id. His parents raised him as a
girl and his twin brother as a boy. See id.
As John grew older, he insisted that he was a boy. See Milton Diamond & H. Keith
Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment at Birth: A Long Term Review and Clinical Implications,
151(3) ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 298 (1997), available at
http://www.augsburg.edu/psych/psy355/no-penis.html (last visited Sept. 30,
2002.). He was ostracized by other children and suicidal. See id. He later obtained
phalloplasty and married. See id.
187. See Bellinger, Fain. supra note 182 at 176-78.
188. 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. 1976).
189. See id. at 205. The parties married in August 1972 and lived together in
New Jersey. See id. The husband moved out of the house in 1974 and thereafter
failed to provide any support. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 209. "Against the backdrop of the evidence in the present record
we must disagree with the conclusion reached in Corbett that for purposes of mar-
riage sex is somehow irrevocably cast at the moment of birth, and that for adjudg-
ing the capacity to enter marriage, sex in its biological sense should be the exclusive
standard." Id.
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ever, show that a person's sex or sexuality embraces an indi-
vidual's gender, that is, one's self-image, the deep psycho-
logical or emotional sense of sexual identity and character.
Indeed, it has been observed that the 'psychological sex of an
individual,' while not serviceable for all purposes, is 'practi-
cal, realistic and humane.'1 93
The New Jersey court affirmed M.T.'s legal identity as a female,
upheld the validity of their marriage, and ordered J.T. to pay
spousal support.194
Although Corbett and Bellinger limited the determination of
sex to the moment of birth, the courts in those cases nevertheless
recognized that sexual identity is based upon a number of dif-
ferent biological factors. The legal system's rigid adherence to a
limited test for sexual identity has resulted in legal anomalies.
The case of Farmer v. Brennan'95 is one such example. In 1986,
Dee Farmer was convicted of credit card fraud and incarcerated
in a male prison.196 Prior to her conviction, Ms. Farmer had
worn women's clothing, taken estrogen, "received silicone
breast implants," and had attempted "'black market' testicle-
removal surgery." 197 Although Ms. Farmer appeared to be fe-
male, she was placed in a male prison in accordance with federal
prison policy to incarcerate preoperative transsexuals according
to their biological sex.198 After placement in several male pris-
ons, Ms. Farmer was ultimately transferred to the United States
Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana.199 Within two weeks of the
transfer, Ms. Farmer "was brutally beaten and raped by another
193. M.T., 355 A.2d at 209 (citations omitted).
194. See id. at 211.
If such sex reassignment surgery is successful and the postoperative trans-
sexual is, by virtue of medical treatment, thereby possessed of the full ca-
pacity to function sexually as a male or female, as the case may be, we
perceive no legal barrier, cognizable social taboo, or reason grounded in
public policy to prevent that person's identification[,] at least for purposes
of marriage to the sex[,] finally indicated.
Id. at 210-11. This requirement of sexual functionality as a prerequisite determina-
tive of sexual identity has been criticized by many scholars. See Valdes, supra note
109, at 131-35; Renee, supra note 76, at 356-61.
195. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
196. See id. at 829-30.
197. Id. at 829.
198. See id. at 829-30. "The practice of federal prison authorities is to incarcerate
preoperative transsexuals with prisoners of like biological [birth-designated]
sex ...." Id. at 829 (citation omitted).
199. See id. at 830. Ms. Farmer was transferred to the Terre Haute, Indiana
prison for disciplinary reasons. See id.
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inmate." 200 Ms. Farmer claimed that the transfer and the incar-
ceration violated her Eighth Amendment rights and "amounted
to a deliberately indifferent failure to protect [her] safety." 20 1
The law may validate a name change 202 and even alteration of a
sex designation on a birth certificate,203 but the law can neverthe-
less refuse to recognize gender as a component of sexual identity
for the purposes of marriage and incarceration. In Dee Farmer's
case, the result exposed her to unnecessary violence and hu-
miliation.
2. The Identity of Gender
While "sexual identity" is often defined by concrete or objective
biological factors, "gender identity" is largely subjective, defined
by psychological, social, and cultural factors.2°4 Although the
words "sex" and "gender" are often used interchangeably, today
more experts refer to an individual's "sex" as biologically based
and "gender" as including an individual's psychological sexual
identity. 205 Gender identity therefore refers to an individual's
self-perception of sexual identity and the outward manifesta-
200. Id. at 852 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
201. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 831. The United States Supreme Court adopted a subjec-
tive test for liability under the Eighth Amendment holding that prison officials are
liable for denying humane conditions of confinement only if they know of and dis-
regard an excessive risk to the inmate's health and safety. See id. at 837.
202. Name changes are not difficult to obtain. See generally ARK. CODE ANN. §§
9-2-101 to 9-2-102 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 2001); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1275-1279.5
(West 1982 & Supp. 2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 68, § 68.07 (Harrison 1997 & Supp.
2002); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 574-5 (Michie 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:4751-
55 (West 1991 & Supp. 2002); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 60-65 (McKinney 1992 &
Supp.2 00 2 ); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2717.01 (West 2002).
203. See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT.§ 36-326(A)(4) (West 1993 & Supp. 2002); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 338-17.7(a)(4)(B) (1993 & Supp. 1994).
204. See M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 206 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1976) (concluding that psy-
chological gender was a component of sexual identity). See also Bellinger, Fam., su-
pra note 179 at 163 (referencing the expert testimony of Professor Green who
opined: "The Corbett criteria are too reductionistic to serve as a viable set of criteria
to determine sex. They also ignore the compelling significance of the psychological
status of the person as a man or a woman."). Accord Richards v. United States Ten-
nis Ass'n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267, 269-70 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (referencing the expert testimony
of Dr. Daniel Federman who opined that sexual identity is a complex pattern that
includes subjective features such as psychological and social sex).
205. See Bellinger, [2002] Fam. at 164 (referencing the expert testimony of Profes-
sor Green who acknowledged, "There are medical experts who would value the
psychological factor as the most important criterion particularly when psychologi-
cal factors, or the person's gender identity, is at variance with any of the other fac-
tors.").
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tions of that perception. 206 By implication, "gender" is a fluid
concept that shifts and evolves as contemporary standards shift
and evolve, and as one's self-image grows and develops. For
example, the notion of "unisex" used to appall when it appeared
in the 1960s, but now is an accepted part of our culture; "unisex"
and cross-dressing permit our collective societal imagination to
roam in the realm of sex and gender. 207
In 1949, Dr. David 0. Cauldwell, a psychiatrist, used the
term "transsexual" to refer to people who sought to change their
sex.20 8 In 1966, Dr. Harry Benjamin, an endocrinologist, adopted
and popularized the term in his book, The Transsexual Phe-
nomenon.20 9 As part of the growing debate surrounding sex-
change operations, doctors and scientists shifted their focus from
concepts of biological sex to "psychological sex" or "gender
identity." 210 The shift in the terminology from "transsexual" to
"transgender" is indicative of society's increased awareness of
the distinction between sex and gender. 211
In approximately 1988, Virginia Prince coined the term
"transgender" to describe people who live full time as the gen-
der "opposite" of their anatomy (sexual identity). 212 Virginia
Prince was a male-to-female activist 213 who sought a term that
would include gays, lesbians, bisexuals, straight and gender-
206. In the 1950s, John Money, Joan G. Hampson, and John L. Hampson pub-
lished a series of articles on intersexuality that introduced the new vocabulary of
gender. In 1955, Dr. Money used the term "gender role" to refer to "all those things
that a person says or does to disclose himself or herself as having the status of boy
or man, girl or woman," and the term "gender" to refer to "outlook, demeanor, and
orientation." JOANNE MEYEROWITZ, How SEX CHANGED A HISTORY OF
TRANSSEXUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 114 (Harvard University Press 2002).
207. See Hubbard, supra note 125, at 50.
208. See MEYEROWITZ, supra note 206, at 5.
209. BROWN & ROUNSLEY, supra note 131, at 28.; see also MEYEROWITZ, supra note
203, at 5-6.
210. MEYEROWITZ, supra note 206, at 6.
211. According to Dr. Ruth Hubbard, a professor of biology, "there is a substan-
tial difference between modern transpersons and classical transsexuals, who by and
large repudiated the genitals with which they were born and spoke of themselves
as men 'imprisoned in the body of a woman' or the other way around." HUBBARD,
supra note 125, at 51.
212. "There had to be some name for people like myself who trans the gender
barrier- meaning somebody who lives full-time in the gender role opposite to their
[sic] anatomy. I have not transed the sex barrier." FEINBERG, supra note 82.
213. Virginia Prince was part of a network of cross-dressers in Southern Califor-
nia and eventually launched a magazine called Transvestia that became the center-
piece of the transvestite movement. MEYEROWITZ, supra note 206, at 181.
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diverse people.21 4 Ms. Prince was dissatisfied with the term
"transvestite" because it was too clinical and did not support or
define the deep emotional feelings of gender-diverse individu-
als.215
The term "transgender" has emerged as a popular alterna-
tive to "transsexual," and refers generally to a diverse group of
individuals who cross or transcend culturally defined categories
of gender.21 6
This group includes male-to-female and female-to-male
transsexuals (those who desire or have had hormone therapy
or sex reassignment surgery), crossdressers or transvestites
(those who desire to wear clothing associated with another
sex), transgenderists (those who live in the gender role asso-
ciated with another sex without desiring sex reassignment
surgery), bigender persons (those who identify as both man
and woman), drag queens and kings (usually gay men and
lesbian women who "do drag" and dress up in, respectively,
women's and men's clothes), and female and male
impersonators (males who impersonate women and females
who impersonate men, usually for entertainment). Within
today's transgender coming out and liberation movement,
even more alternative identities have emerged such as
gender blender, gender bender, [and] genderfree. 217
Gender dysphoria, or gender identity disorder, is a medical
term used to diagnose individuals who possess "a preoccupa-
tion to live as a member of the other sex," which "may be mani-
fested as an intense desire to adopt the social role of the other
sex or to acquire the physical appearance of the other sex
through hormonal or surgical manipulation." 218 The medicaliza-
214. See Angela Brightfeather, Unity Community with Angela Brightfeather, Q-
Notes Online, at http://www.q-notes.com/unitycommunity.htm (last visited Apr.
9, 2003).
215. Dr. Magnus Hirschfeld invented the word "transvestite" to refer to males
who identified as females. The term "trans" meaning to cross over and "vestite"
from the Greek for feminine. MEYEROWITZ, supra note 206, at 19.
In 1923, Dr. Hirschfeld used the term "seelischen Transsexualismus," or spiritual
transsexualism, in a published article, but he apparently did not use the term
"transsexual" the way we use it today. For people who hoped to change their sex,
he used the term "transvestite." See id.
216. See Walter 0. Bockting, Ph.D., From Construction to Context: Gender Through
the Eyes of the Transgendered, SEXUAL HEALTH TODAY, vol. 3, no. 1 Winter 2000, at 1,
at http://www.med.umn.edu/fp/phs/sht/shtv3nl/htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2003).
217. Id.
218. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS-IV 533 (4th ed. 1994). Accord Bonnie Bullough &
2003]
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tion of transgender individuals as having an illness that can be
"cured" with surgery has been criticized by many activists.219 In
the 1970s, private surgeons discovered that sex reassignment
surgery provided a lucrative business. 220 According to one re-
port, transsexuality had grown into a "$10 million-a-year busi-
ness."221 Although many surgeons were reputable, at least a few
were viewed as "back-alley butchers." 222
Dr. Anne Fausto-Sterling, a biologist and feminist, has pro-
posed that physicians, "[s]top infant genital surgery."223 In her
book, Sexing The Body,224 she recounts life stories of individuals
who have suffered depression, multiple surgeries, scarring, and
feelings of shame and betrayal from secret "corrective" genital
surgery.225 In Dr. Fausto-Sterling's opinion, "medicine's focus
on creating the perfect genitals, meant to prevent psychological
suffering, clearly contributes to it."226 She hopes for a future in
which "gender variability" is accepted without the need for
Vern L. Bullough, Transsexualism Historical Perspectives, 1952 to Present, in CURRENT
CONCEPTS IN TRANSGENDER IDENTITY 22 (Dallas Denny ed., Garland Publishing, Inc.
1998) ("Gender-identity disorder" replaced "transsexualism" in the 1994 edition).
The problem was that transsexualism was too specific - it detailed a condi-
tion which only the patients' own accounts could demonstrate, and it
specified a type of treatment (sex-reassignment surgery). Gender dyspho-
ria is, by contrast, a very general descriptive term for a sympton. To say
that a patient suffers from gender dysphoria is as noncommittal as saying
a patient suffers from back pain or headaches. Further diagnosis and
treatment is firmly retained in professional hands.
Richard Ekins & Dave King, Blending Genders Contributions to the Emerging Field of
Transgender Studies, in CURRENT CONCEPTS IN TRANSGENDER IDENTITY 97-98 (Dallas
Denny ed., Garland Publishing, Inc. 1998) (citation omitted).
219. See Dwight B. Billings and Thomas Urban, The Socio-Medical Construction of
Transsexualism: An Interpretation and Critique, 29 SOC. PROBS. 266 (1982). See also
FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 136, at ch. 4.
220. See MEYEROWITZ, supra note 206, at 271.
221. Id. at 271 (citing Roger Starr, Cutting the Ties That Bind, HARPER'S, May 1978,
at 49).
222. Dr. John Ronald Brown is one example. Dr. Brown allegedly used Valium
before surgery and purposely damaged the vagina of a patient who angered him.
He lost his medical license in California in 1977. See MEYEROWITZ, supra note 206, at
271-72.
223. FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 136, at 79.
224. FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 136.
225. Cheryl Chase, the founder of the Intersexual Society of North America, was
raised as a boy until she was eighteen months old when she underwent a complete
clitorectomy. See id. at 80-81. When she was older, she was told that she needed a
hernia operation but in fact, the operation was to remove the testicular portion of
her gonads. See id. Cheryl did not learn that she had been born intersexed until she
was 23 years old. See id.
226. Id. at 86.
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medical intervention. 227
The diagnosis of "transsexualism" as an illness or disorder
seems counter-productive to the acceptance of "gender variabil-
ity." Nevertheless, the categorization of gender dysphoria as an
"illness" has its advantages. 228 The medical diagnosis of "gender
dysphoria" has enabled some individuals to obtain health insur-
ance coverage for hormone treatments and sex reassignment
surgery.229 However, some criticize members of the medical
profession as the subjective and arbitrary "gatekeepers" in de-
ciding who is eligible for sex reassignment surgery.
230
The controversy over the medicalization of transgender in-
dividuals is similar to the debate that surrounded the prior in-
clusion of homosexuality as an illness.231 As the movement for
transgender rights continues to grow, 232 the likely result will be
the recognition that a transgender individual is not mentally ill
simply on the basis of his or her transgender status. "Trans-
gender" is not simply a third category of gender, but a reality of
the broad spectrum of human possibilities beyond "male" and
"female." 233
227. See id. at 101.
228. See Susan Etta Keller, Crisis of Authority: Medical Rhetoric and Transsexual
Identity, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51, 59 (1999).
[A] reliance on a medical model of transsexuality, despite its disempower-
ing potential, is often deemed necessary for the provision of public and
private medical insurance benefits for transsexuals, adequate treatment in
prison, relief from arrest, and other benefits as well as a justification for the
gender reassignment surgery sought by transsexuals.
Id.
229. See generally Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1980). The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that sex reassignment surgery was "medically neces-
sary" as "the only successful treatment" for the "very complex medical and psycho-
logical problem" of transsexualism. Id. at 550. The court held that the costs of
surgery were covered under the state's Medicaid plan. See id.
230. See Judith Shapiro, Transsexualism: Reflections on the Persistence of Gender and
the Mutability of Sex, in BODY GUARDS: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF GENDER
AMBIGUITY 248, 254 (Julia Epstein & Kristina Straub eds., Routledge, Chapman, and
Hall, Inc. 1991) ("Physical attractiveness seems to have provided the major basis for
an optimistic prognosis in male to female sex change.").
231. Ironically, transsexualism was included in the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders for the first time in
1980, in the same edition in which homosexuality was first removed. See Keller, su-
pra note 222, at 52.
232. See supra note 80.
233. See Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female Are Not
Enough, THE SCIENCES, Mar./Apr. 1993, at 20-21.
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3. Sexual Orientation
Sexual orientation is neither sexual identity nor gender.
There is no obvious correlation between sexual identity, gender,
and sexual orientation. 234 Transgender individuals, like the rest
of the human population, may be attracted to men and women,
and may sexually interact with homosexual, bisexual, and het-
erosexually-identified individuals. 235 "Sexual orientation" thus
refers to a preference or physical attraction towards individuals
of a particular sex or gender. 236 In other words, it seems gener-
ally understood, both legally and culturally, that "homosexuals"
are those persons whose "sexual orientation" is same-sex di-
rected, that "heterosexuals" are those persons whose "sexual
orientation" is cross-sex directed, and "bisexuals" are those per-
sons whose "sexual orientation" is directed at both sexes.237
The definition of sexual orientation often implies that indi-
viduals are only heterosexual, homosexual, or both.238 However,
the limited tripartite model of sexual preference contradicts the
historical variance of sexual practices that has existed through-
out the history of humankind.239 The study of human sexuality
is much more complex. Multidimensional models exist rating
sexual attraction, sexual behavior, sexual fantasies, emotional
preference, social preference, self-identification, and heterosex-
ual/homosexual lifestyle as several factors contributing to sex-
ual orientation. 240
In ancient Greek and Roman cultures, homosexuality was
commonplace and socially tolerated. 241 Beginning in the Middle
Ages, the dominant Christian view was that of a distrust of sex-
ual expression, with a grudging tolerance for procreation within
the confines of marriage. 242 Since homosexuality and bisexuality
do not necessarily involve procreation, most Christians consid-
234. See Ross, supra note 126, at 1-8.
235. See Bockting, supra note 216, at 4.
236. See Valdes, supra note 114, at 51.
237. See id. at 135.
238. See FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 136, at 12 ("Most Westerners assumed that
people's sexuality could be classified two or three ways: homosexual, heterosexual,
and bisexual.").
239. See id.
240. See FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 136, at 10.
241. See Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis.
L. REV. 187, 197 (1988).
242. The American states adopted the prohibition through its incorporation of
the common law. See id. at 198.
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ered such conduct immoral and objectionable.243 Limiting hu-
man sexuality to a primal need for procreation diminishes the
emotional value in human relationships and devalues those in-
dividuals in our society who cannot or do not procreate.
Society's present conflation of sex, gender, and sexual orien-
tation reinforces the conservative right's moralistic objection to
any variance from binary genderism. Just as science and history
illustrate that sex and gender are not limited to two categories,
sexual orientation likewise cannot be restricted to the categories
of homosexuality and heterosexuality; the range of human be-
havior is much broader.
B. Gender Multiplicity in Other Cultures
As discussed above, incongruity among the eight factors
that constitute sexual identity has existed throughout the history
of humankind. 244 In addition to chromosomal, hormonal, and
internal organ ambiguities, which may not be externalized at
birth, ambiguity may exist as to external genitalia, resulting in
an intersexed 245 condition. Individuals with double, doubtful,
and/or mistaken external sex are typically referred to as inter-
sexed or hermaphrodites. 246
The number of intersexed individuals in the world is diffi-
cult to determine with precision, in part because experts dis-
agree as to which ambiguous or doubtful external sex conditions
should be included in that statistic.247 Nevertheless, estimates
range from 1-4% of the world's population.248 At birth, inter-
243. St. Thomas Aquinas argued that non-procreative sex violated the laws of
nature. See id.
244. Plato wrote that there were originally three sexes-male, female, and her-
maphrodite-but that the third sex became lost over time. See FAUSTO-STERLING,
supra note 136, at 33.
245. Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, the term "intersexed" began to re-
place "hermaphrodite." "Intersexed" literally means that an individual is between
the sexes-that s/he slips between and blends maleness and femaleness. By con-
trast the term "hermaphroditic" implies that a person has both male and female at-
tributes, that s/he is not a third sex or a blended sex, but instead that s/he is a sort
of double sex, that is, in possession of a body which juxtaposes essentially "male"
and essentially "female" parts. See DREGER, supra note 144, at 31.
246. There is a growing momentum to eliminate the word "hermaphrodite"
from medical literature because it is viewed by some as stigmatizing and mislead-
ing. See On the Word "Hermaphrodite," Intersex Society of North America, at
http://isna.org/faq/language.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2003).
247. See DREGER, supra note 144, at 40-42.
248. See id. at 42 (crediting Anne Fausto-Sterling as responsible for estimating
the number at one percent). See also SUZANNE J. KESSLER, LESSONS FROM THE
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sexed infants often are assigned a sex based on subjective stereo-
types. Penile length is the most important factor in sex assign-
ment at birth.249 The standard medical practice for intersexed
infants is surgery to remove sexual ambiguity. 2 0 According to
one study, 90% of babies with ambiguous genitals are desig-
nated as "female" and surgically altered accordingly because,
"You can make a hole, but you can't build a pole." 251
Intersexed individuals have been recognized and accepted
without shame in other cultures.25 2 Data gathered on the tradi-
tional practices of various North American Indians establishes
the existence of individuals who "transformed" or "changed
sexes." 253 The so-called "berdache" has been used as a "general
designation for individuals who take on gender roles in opposi-
tion to their anatomical sex by adopting the dress and perform-
ing the activities of members of the other group." 254 The Lakota
culture used the term "winkte," meaning "male to female." 255
"In paleo-Asiatic, ancient Mediterranean, Indian, Oceanic, and
African tribes, men who adopted the ways and dress of women
enjoyed high esteem as shamans, priests, and sorcerers-all per-
sons whose supernatural powers were feared and revered." 25 6
In several small villages in the Dominican Republic and
among the Sambia people in Papua, New Guinea, 5-Alpha Re-
ductase Deficiency occurs with high frequency. 2 7 Although
these children appear female at birth, they have an XY chromo-
INTERSEXED 135, n.4 (Rutgers University Press 1998); Greenberg, supra note 132, at
267 ("If, as some experts believe, the number of intersexed people is four percent,
approximately ten million people in the United States will be affected.").
249. See Suzanne J. Kessler, The Medical Construction of Gender: Case Management
of Intersexed Infants, 16 SIGNS 3 (1990). See also PHYLLIS BURKE, GENDER SHOCK:
EXPLODING THE MYTHS OF MALE AND FEMALE 221-28 (Anchor Books 1996).
250. See R. L. Rothstein & R. M. Couch, Management of Intersex: Approach to Am-
biguous Genitalia, BRIT. COLOM. MED. J. 493, 495 (Aug. 1992).
251. Melissa Hendricks, "is It a Boy or a Girl?," JOHN HOPKINS MAG., Nov. 1993,
at 10-16.
252. See Sue-Ellen Jacobs & Jason Cromwell, Visions and Revisions of Reality: Re-flections on Sex, Sexuality, Gender, and Gender Variance, 23 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 43, 62
(1992).
253. See Richard Green, Mythological, Historical, and Cross-Cultural Aspects of
Transsexualism, in CURRENT CONCEPTS IN TRANSGENDER IDENTITY 8-10 (Dallas
Denny ed., Garland Publishing 1998).
254. Judith Shapiro, Transsexualism: Reflections on the Persistence of Gender and the
Mutability of Sex, in BODY GUARDS 263 (Julia Epstein and Kristina Straub eds., 1991).
255. See Cheryl Long Feather, Four Directions-Tribal Culture Loses the Element of
Acceptance, BISMARCK TRIB., Jan. 13, 1999, at 1B; FEINBERG, supra note 82, at 26.
256. Green, supra note 253, at 10.
257. See FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 136, at 109.
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some pattern and, at puberty, begin to develop male genitalia.
The Dominicans call this "third sex," "guevodoche," or "penis at
twelve." 258 The Sambians use the term "kwolu-aatmwol," sug-
gesting a transformation "into a male thing."
259
For the past 2,500 years in India, individuals who wish to
live as members of the "opposite" gender may choose to become
part of the Hirja caste or "third gender" caste.260 "Hirja" trans-
lates as "hermaphrodite," "eunuch," or "sacred erotic female-
man."261 Religious texts include references to transgendered in-
dividuals. The Talmud and the Tosefta have detailed rules re-
garding "androgynos" and "hermaphrodite" in reference to
individuals who have "both male and female characteristics and
organs."262
Even early English law recognized the existence of trans-
gendered individuals. According to Bracton, individuals could
be classified as "male, female, or hermaphrodite." 263 In the six-
teenth century, the legal scholar Lord Coke wrote, "[e]very heire
is either a male, or female, or an hermaphrodite, that is both
male and female. And an hermaphrodite (which is also called
Androgynus) shall be heire, either as male or female, according
to that kind of the sexe which doth prevaile."
264
Intersexed and transgendered individuals have existed
throughout history and around the globe. 265 Anglo-American
culture's rigid adherence to a binary system of sex and gender is
contrary to medical and scientific data. Human beings come in
many shapes, sizes, colors, sexes, and genders. Intersexed and
transgendered individuals have begun to find their voices to
demand their right to self-identify both their sexual identity and
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See Serena Nanda, The Hirjas of India: Cultural and Individualized Third Gender
Role, THE MANY FACES OF HOMOSEXUALITY: ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO
HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR 165 (Evelyn Blackwood ed., 1986). See also Gianna E. Is-
rael, Transgenderists: ihen Self-Identification Challenges Transgender Stereotypes, at
http://www.firelily.com/gender/gianna/transgenderists.html (last visited Apr. 9,
2003).
261. See id.
262. See ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA (CD ROM, 1997).
263. 2 BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 81 (Samuel E.
Thorne trans., 1968).
264. 1 E. COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 8.a.
(1st Am. Ed. 1812).
265. Physicians in the Middle Ages believed in the sexual continuum theory al-
though they argued for sharper divisions of sexual variation. See FAUSTO-STERLING,
supra note 136, at 34.
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their gender. 266 Through its laws and judicial decisions, society
must hear these voices.
Recently, several international cases have addressed the le-
gal rights of transgendered and intersexed individuals.67 In
1996, the Court of Justice of the European Communities held
that the termination of an employee who intended to undergo
sex reassignment surgery was in violation of the European Equal
Treatment Directive prohibiting sex discrimination:268 "To toler-
ate such discrimination would be tantamount, as regards such a
person, to failure to respect the dignity and freedom, to which
he or she is entitled, and which the court has a duty to safe-
guard." 269
In New Zealand, the High Court of Wellington ruled in At-
torney General v. Otahuhu Family Court that self-identified sex is
an individual's legal sex for purposes of marriage.270 The New
Zealand court recognized that the concept of sexual identity in-
cludes a psychological component and criticized the Corbett's
court failure to so hold.271 "There is no social advantage in thelaw not recognizing the validity of the marriage of a transsexual
in the sex of reassignment. It would merely confirm the factual
reality." 272
Although many other international decisions 273 follow the
reasoning in Corbett and refuse to recognize gender identity as
an integral component of an individual's sexual identity, the
persistent existence of these cases establish a significant emerg-
266. Support groups for intersexed individuals include: the Intersex Society ofNorth America, the Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome Support Group, TransgenderMenace, Klinefelter Syndrome and Associates, and the Genital Mutilation Survi-
vor's Support Network and Workgroup on Violence in Pediatrics and Gynecology.267. Many courts have refused to recognize an individual's self-claimed gender.In C v. C, 1992 Ont. C.J. Lexis 1518 (1992), a Canadian court held that a marriagebetween a female-to-male transsexual and a woman was invalid because the hus-band had never "changed" his sex to male. Id. at *4. See also Lim Ying v. Hiok KianMing Eric, 1991 SLR LEXIS 184 (the Singapore High Court nullified a marriage be-
tween a woman and a post-operative male on the grounds that legal sex for pur-
poses of marriage is fixed at birth.).
268. See Case C-13/94, P v. S, 1996 ICR 795 (1996).
269. Id. at 814.
270. See (1995) 1 NZLR 603, 606.
271. See id. at 606-07.
272. Id. at 607.
273. Rees v. United Kingdom, 9 EHRR 56 (1986) (refusing to recognize a "trans-
sexual" female for purposes of marriage). See also Cossey v. United Kingdom, 13EHRR 622 (1990); C v. C 1992 Ont. C.J. Lexis 1518 (voideing a marriage because thefemale-to-male transsexual remained a male for purposes of marriage).
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ing area of transgender rights.274
V. JUDICIAL TREATMENT AND MISTREATMENT OF TRANSGENDER
PARENTS
A. Trans-Parent-See275 and the Per Se Rule Against Custody
Courts have generally followed two approaches 276 in child
custody cases: the per se rule and the nexus test.277 Although
few cases have strictly applied the per se rule to preclude an
award of child custody,278 the per se rule has been widely used
to deny child custody to gay and lesbian parents simply because
of their sexual orientation. 279 A majority of courts today follow
the nexus test in deciding child custody.280 Under the nexus test,
a court will consider a parent's behavior only if that behavior
has some negative nexus or influence on the child.281 In a true
determination of what is in the best interest of the child, the
courts should likewise determine whether a negative "nexus"
282
274. The decision in Case C-13/94, P v. S, (1996) led to the Sex Discrimination
(Gender reassignment ) regulations 1999 (SI 1999/1102) enacted under Section 2(2)
of the European Communities Act 1972. See also Sheffield and Horsham v. United
Kingdom 27 EHRR 163 1998 (The European Court of Human Rights stated "there is
an increased social acceptance of transsexualism and an increased recognition of the
problems which post-operative transsexuals encounter. Even if it finds no breach of
article 8 in this case, the court reiterates that this area needs to be kept under review
by contracting states.").
275. "Within the last decade, there has been greater visibility of transgendered
people as a permanent status or 'third sex.' Formerly, the transsexual ideal was to
disappear into the 'other' gender and to be known simply as a man or a woman."
See Ekins & King, supra note 218, at 104.
276. Some commentators have identified more than two approaches in custody
cases. See generally Robert A. Beargie, Custody Determinations Involving the Homosex-
ual Parent, 22 FAM. L.Q. 71 (1988) (identifying a third category of consisting of a re-
buttable presumption); Katheryn D. Katz, Majoritarian Morality and Parental Rights,
52 ALB. L. REV. 405 (1988) (identifying four categories).
277. See Julie Shapiro, Custody and Conduct: How the Law Fails Lesbian and Gay
Parents and Their Children, 71 IND. L.J. 623, 635-41 (1996). The per se rule establishes
an irrebuttable presumption that a parent is unfit because of certain behavior or
conduct, while the nexus test merely considers such conduct as one factor affecting
the welfare of the child. See id.
278. See id. at 634. See also Cox, supra note 72, at 792.
279. See Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987); Roe v.
Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 693 (Va. 1985); M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 969 (Okla. 1982).
But see Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (Va. 1995).
280. See Shapiro, supra note 277, at 635.
281. See id. at 633.
282. Courts using the nexus test consider a parent's behavior as only one factor
in the determination of what is in the best interest of the child. See S.N.E. v. R.L.B.,
699 P.2d 875, 878 (Alaska 1985) ("We have often endorsed the requirement that
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exists between a parent's transgender status and the well-being
of the child before precluding an award of custody based upon
that parent's transgender status. Gender identity is a social con-
struct generally limited to the binary categories of
female and male; those who do not fit neatly into one or the
other simply cannot exist in the law.283 In child custody cases
across the United States, transgender parents have faced pre-
sumptions and assumptions about their sexual identity and
gender.284 Transgender parents have fought to retain their rights
as parents under the law.
In Daly v. Daly,285 the Supreme Court of Nevada took the ex-
treme position of terminating the parental rights of a father who
had undergone sex reassignment surgery to change his sexual
anatomy from male to female.286 The court concluded that ter-
mination of the parent-child relationship was "in the child's best
interests."287 The court opined that the father, now living his life
as "Suzanne," was a "selfish person whose own needs, desires
and wishes were paramount and were indulged without regard
to their impact on the life and psyche of the daughter, Mary." 288
Notably absent from the court's majority opinion is any discus-
sion regarding the historical existence of gender multiplicity.
According to the Nevada court, Suzanne had effectively
terminated her parental rights by choosing "to discard his fa-
therhood and assume the role of a female who could never be
either mother or sister to his daughter.289 The court also ob-jected to Suzanne's friendships with lesbians, homosexuals and
transsexuals.
Suzanne, who admitted that many of her friends are to be
found among the aforementioned groups, has thus postured
there be a nexus between the conduct of the parent relied on by the court and the
parent-child relationship."); see also M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960, 965 (App. Div.1986) ("[T]he homosexuality of a parent should only be an issue insofar as the par-
ent's sexual orientation can be proven to have harmed the child.") (quoting Rhonda
R. Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-Eighties, 11 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 275, 330 (1986)).
283. See Renee, supra note 76, at 345-46.
284. See generally J.L.S. v. D.K.S., 943 S.W.2d 766, 769 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Cisek
v. Cisek, No. 80 C. A. 113, 1982 WL 6161, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 20, 1982); Daly v.
Daly, 715 P.2d 56, 57 (Nev. 1986).
285. 715 P.2d at 58-59.
286. See id at 57.
287. Id. at 58.
288. Id. at 59.
289. Id.
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herself in a position of recurring conflict with the child's
mother and the 'traditional' upbringing enjoyed by Mary
during her formative years. The resulting equation does not
bode well for the emotional health and well-being of the
child. 290
The Nevada Supreme Court attempted to clarify that its de-
cision was based on the negative effect on Mary of Suzanne's
gender change rather than on the change itself,291 but the at-
tempted distinction appeared half-hearted and disingenuous.
The majority claimed to terminate Suzanne's parental rights be-
cause of "the substantial risk of emotional or mental injury were
[Mary] forced to visit with her father."2 92 This claim by the ma-
jority was disingenuous, given that Suzanne was willing to
forego any visitation rights with Mary, provided that she could
maintain her status as Mary's parent.293 Suzanne hoped that
Mary would eventually wish to resume a relationship with
her.294 As the dissent aptly stressed, "[alt the outset, it should be
emphasized that the father does not seek visitation rights at the
present time. Hence, with all respect to my brethren in the ma-
jority, it seems inappropriate to bottom a ruling against him on
the supposition that visitation with him could injure Mary."
295
The Nevada court erroneously substituted its own vision of
"family" in place of Mary's real family-Mary has a mother and a
father who changed his gender identity. The court's prevention
of Mary's exposure to a particular minority group that the court
found offensive is an example of personal prejudice and bias.
The majority's decision represents the very "standardization" of
children that the United States Supreme Court warned against in
1925.296
290. 715 P. 2d at 59.
291. See id. at 58 n.4.
292. Id. at 59.
293. See id.
In conclusion, I reiterate that Mary and her father currently are totally
separated, for he is willing to forego visitation rights at present, in order to
maintain his legal status as Mary's parent. This separation protects Mary
from all of the concerns, imagined or real, which underlay the district
court's termination of parental rights.
Id. at 63 (Gunderson, J., dissenting).
294. See id. at 64.
295. See id. at 60.
296. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (challenging an Oregon law
requiring parents and guardians of children between the ages of eight and sixteen
to send those children to public school).
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Another case applying the per se rule against a transgender
parent is Cisek v. Cisek, in which the Ohio Court of Appeals ter-
minated the father's visitation rights with his two minor chil-
dren following a "complete change of sex." 297 The mother's
medical expert, Dr. Giannini, opined that the daughters would
have difficulty adjusting to their father as a woman. 298 Dr.
Giannini recommended that "physical contact.., be stopped."299
Demonstrating a fundamental lack of understanding about
transgenderism, the court terminated visitation with a gratui-
tous question: "Was his sex change simply an indulgence of
some fantasy?" 300 The court incorrectly conflated sexuality, sex-
ual identity, and gender identity and failed to comprehend the
enormous social cost, individual stress, legal consequences and
financial expense involved in changing one's gender identity.301
Another example of a per se preclusion of custody based on
a parent's change in gender identity can be found in the Mis-
souri case of J.L.S. v. D.K.S.302 In J.L.S., the father struggled with
his gender identity throughout his marriage and ultimately un-
derwent sex reassignment surgery after divorce. Although the
trial court found him to be a "loving and caring father, the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals nevertheless reversed the award of joint
custody."3 3 The court also precluded any visitation until "the
children are emotionally and mentally suited for physical con-
tact with their father." 304
In all of the aforementioned decisions, the courts reiterated
their deference for the "best interest of the child," but failed to
297. 1982 WL 6161 at *1.
298. See id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at *2.
301. See Katrina C. Rose, The Transsexual and the Damage Done: The Fourth Court of
Appeals Opens Pandoina's Box by Closing the Door on Transsexuals' Right to Marry, 9
LAW & SEXUALITY 1, 134 n.8 (1999-2000).
No one wakes up one morning and says, "Gee. I think that from now on I
will willingly choose to become part of (one of) the most misunderstood
minorities in America. I want to make my life more difficult by confusing
and perhaps losing the love of my family and friends. I want to be sub-jected to hate crimes and employment discrimination. I want to go
through the physical and financial pain of obtaining sex reassignment sur-
gery."
Id. (quoting Sarah DePalma, Littleton Update, TGAIN Press Release e-mail (Jan. 14,
2000)).
302. 943 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
303. Id. at 771.
304. Id. at 773-74.
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balance that standard against the legal parent's constitutional
right of due process in raising his or her own child.305 Missing
from all of these reported decisions is the medical data evidenc-
ing gender mulitiplicity.
A transgendered individual does not "choose" to live his or
her life as a member of the "opposite" sex.306 The courts' erro-
neous belief that transgenderism is a "choice," 30 7 and the courts'
proclamation of a transgender parent as "selfish," 3°8 is indicative
of the courts' refusal to see beyond binary genderism and refusal
to consider the constitutional rights of the biological parent. In
applying the "best interest of the child" standard, these courts
have abused their discretion by injecting their own subjective
standard of morality and prejudice without first gaining an un-
derstanding of the human continuum of sex and gender.
B. Trans-Parent-See and the Negative Nexus Test
In making child custody decisions, few courts in the United
States have applied the negative nexus test in cases in which a
transgender parent is involved. 30 9 These courts concluded that if
a parent's transgender status did not have a negative effect on
the well-being of the child, transgenderism did not per se pre-
clude an award of custody to that parent. With one exception,
310
the few cases awarding child custody to a transgender parent
were based upon that parent's willingness to keep his/ her
transgender identity and behavior repressed or a secret.311 Since
the parent's transgender status had no 'negative' effect on the
child, the fact of transgenderism did not preclude an award of
custody.
305. See supra notes 43-50.
306. See, e.g., Gretchen Edgren, The Transformation of Tula, PLAYBOY, Sept. 1991,
at 103, 105 ("I can't understand why people don't realize that my predicament had
nothing to do with choice." (quoting Caroline "Tula" Cossey, a transsexual
model)).
307. "It was strictly Tim Daly's choice to discard his fatherhood and assume the
role of a female who could never be either mother or sister to his daughter." Daly
v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56, 59 (Nev. 1986).
308. Id. at 63.
309. See Christian v. Randall, 516 P.2d 132, 134 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973); In re T.J.,
No. C2-87-1786, 1988 WL 8302 *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1988); In Re Marriage of
Kantaras, Case No. 98-5375CA, February 21, 2003 Opinion, available at
http: www.courttv.com/trials/kantaras.
310. See generally Christian, 516 P.2d 132 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973).
311. See infra notes 312-23.
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In the Minnesota case of In re T.J.,312 the court of appeals re-
fused to disturb the father's award of custody despite the fa-
ther's "gender conflict." 313
[The father] has decided to maintain his male identity. T.J.
has exhibited no atypical manifestations which would lead
the Court to conclude that his father's gender dysphoria has
affected him in any way... In addition, there is no evidence
which would lead the Court to believe that providing pri-
mary parenting responsibilities to a gender dysphoric father
would cause future problems for T.J. 314
Although the court stated that the father's "condition does not
automatically disqualify him from having a relationship with his
child," notably, in In re T.J., the father was neither living life as a
female nor dressing like one. 315 He remained trans-parent; 316 as
long as he retained a gender identity consistent with his biologi-
cal sex, the court was willing to retain the award of custody.
The Minnesota case In re Welfare of V.H. was similarly de-
cided.317 In that case, the father was awarded physical custody of
the parties' daughter despite his transvestism.318 The result was
influenced with the existence of evidence that the child had suf-
fered physical and sexual abuse at the hands of her mother.319
Evidence was also presented as to the effect of the father's trans-
vestism on the emotional and psychological well-being of the
child.320 One expert testified that knowledge of the father's be-
havior would prove harmful to the child's own sexual iden-
tity.321 The court responded, "On the other hand, [the father] has
taken positive steps to keep his behavior from his daughter. He
does not cross-dress in front of her and he has made plans for
discussing his transvestism with his daughter and a therapist
when she is old enough to be told."322 Since the father had
agreed to keep his daughter from discovering his cross-dressing
and since the mother had abused the child, the court readily
312. See In re T.J., 1988 WL 8302.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Ekins & King, supra note 218 , at 104.
317. 412 N.W.2d 389 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
318. See id.
319. See id. at 392.
320. See id.
321. See id. at 393.
322. Id.
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awarded physical custody of the child to the father, finding this
result to be in the "best interest of the child." 323
In Christian v. Randall,324 the Colorado Court of Appeals ap-
plied the negative nexus test to a custodial mother who had un-
dergone a change in her gender identity. In that case, the father
petitioned for custody of his four daughters after learning that
his former wife had undergone a "transsexual change" 325 and
had married a woman. Since all of the children were happy and
well-adjusted, the Court of Appeals relied on a Colorado statute
that precludes the court's consideration of "conduct that does
not affect [the custodian's] relationship with the child."326 The
court concluded that the mother's transgenderism "did not ad-
versely affect [her] relationship with the children nor impair
their emotional development." 327 The court denied the father's
petition for change in custody because the mother's transgender
status had no negative nexus to the children's well-being.328 The
children were aware of their mother's gender change and appar-
ently were "happy, healthy, well-adjusted children who were
doing well in school and who were active in community activi-
ties." 329
In the case of In re Marriage of Kantaras, the Florida court re-
viewed the criteria 330 to be followed in determining which par-
323. See id.
324. 516 P.2d 132 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973).
325. See id. at 132.
326. "1971 Perm. Supp., C.R.S.1963, 46-1-24(2), specifically directs that, in deter-
mining best interests, 'The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian
that does not affect his relationship with the child.'" Id. at 134.
327. Id.
328. See id.
329. Id. at 133.
330. The Kantaras court considered the following criteria: (1) The parent who is
more likely to allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the nonresiden-
tial parent; (2) The love, affection and other emotional ties existing between the par-
ents and the child; (3) The capacity and disposition of the parents to provide the
child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care, and other material
needs; (4) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory, environ-
ment and the desirability of maintaining continuity; (5) The permanence, as a fam-
ily unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home; (6) The moral fitness of the
parents; (7) The mental and physical health of the parents: (8) The home, school,
and community record of the child; (9) The reasonable preference of the child, if the
Court deems the child to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding and experience
to express a preference; and, (10) The willingness and ability of each parent to facili-
tate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the
children and the other parent. In Re Marriage of Kantaras, supra note 2 at 785-90.
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ent should be the "primary residential custodian" and con-
cluded that Michael the father, qualified best, despite the father's
transgender status.331 In a thoughtful and lengthy opinion, the
court reviewed cases involving the issue of marriage for trans-
gendered individuals and whether birth sex is conclusive for
purposes of marriage.332 The court rejected the "traditional ap-
proach" 333 of limiting an individual's sex to that designated at
birth, stating, "To adhere to a two-part biological classification of
sex, male and female, with no variations between has the benefit
of dogmatic rigidity." 334 The court validated the marriage and
awarded primary residential custody of the children to Mi-
chael.335
The remaining reported custody decision involving a trans-
gender parent is the Oregon case In re Darnell.336 The court ter-
minated the parental rights of the mother Linda Thain Darnell
because of drug use, her failure to provide an adequate envi-
ronment for her four-year old daughter, and her continued rela-
tionship with David Darnell. 337 Thus, David was identified by
the court as a "transsexual," 338 whose parental rights were ter-
minated in an earlier proceeding before the court.339 Although
the court objected to the mother's continued relationship with
331. Id.
332. Id. at 722-28.
333. "It would appear from the decisions the "traditional approach" to marriage
is the main road traveled. Possibly because of its utter simplicity." Id. at 721.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 808.
336. 619 P.2d 1349 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
337.
Linda Darnell is not a credible witness; Linda Darnell is not amenable to
supervision of this Court; Linda Darnell used drugs in 1978 - this finding
based upon the testimony of witnesses that the Court finds are credible;
Linda Darnell committed perjury regarding the activities of David Darnell;
Linda Darnell has maintained an uninterrupted association with David
Darnell to the date of this hearing; Linda Darnell failed to provide the
child with an adequate environment to meet the child's physical and emo-
tional needs; Linda Darnell has failed to effect a lasting adjustment of her
circumstances after reasonable efforts by available social agencies for such
extended durations of time that it appears reasonable no lasting adjust-
ment can be effected; Linda Darnell is unwilling or unable to disassociate
herself from David Darnell and her continuation of the relationship with
David Darnell is detrimental to the best interests of the child.
Id. at 1351.
338. See id. at 1352 n.3.
339. See id. at 1352.
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David, the court's objection to the relationship does not appear
to be based on David's transsexuality. Rather, the court's termi-
nation of parental rights was based upon a number of factors,
including the mother's lack of responsibility and credibility.
340
David's "transsexuality" had little impact on the court's final de-
cision. In re Darnell is important if only to establish that trans-
sexuality, or a change in gender identity, should only be one of
many factors used to determine the best interest of the child. As
discussed in the following section, children of transgender par-
ents do not necessarily experience gender confusion, nor are
they unable to accept a parent's gender change.
VI. CHILDREN OF TRANSGENDER PARENTS
Linda wants to be a woman. Linda wants to start a fresh life.
She likes living as a woman. I think that is happy for her. At
first (when I was 41/2) I didn't quite understand. As I got
older, I realized she must be happy living as a woman, so I'll
just accept that.
-Seven year old boy with a male-to-female transsexual
parent.341
Is it possible for a child to accept a parent's gender change?
Not according to psychiatrist Dr. James Giannini, who testified
before the Ohio Court of Appeals in Cisek v. Cisek.342 In his opin-
ion, the parent's transsexualism "would have a sociopathic affect
on the child ... without appropriate intervention." 343  Dr.
Giannini, thus, recommended that "physical contact should be
stopped."344 Based upon these "negative medical opinions,"
345
the Ohio court terminated the parent's visitation rights without
considering any expert opinion or evidence to the contrary.346
To the contrary is renowned psychiatrist Dr. Richard
Green.347 "Available evidence does not support concerns that a
340. The petition for termination alleged that the mother believed that David
Darnell was Jesus Christ and that she was the Holy Spirit. See id. at 1350.
341. Richard Green, Transsexuals' Children, [2 No. 4] INT'L. J. OF
TRANSGENDERISM, (Oct.-Dec. 1998) available at
http://www.symposion.com/ijt/ijtc0601.htm.
342. Cisek v. Cisek, No. 80 C. A. 113, 1982 WL 6161, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 20,
1982).
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at *2.
346. "Common sense dictates that there can be social harm." Id.
347. Richard Green is both a psychiatrist and an attorney who has authored, co-
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parent's transsexualism directly adversely impacts on the chil-
dren."348 He suggested that courts should be educated regard-
ing clinical and research findings about these children.349 In
deciding the best interest of a child who has a transgender par-
ent, the court should first distinguish sex and gender and then
undertake a study of gender multiplicity. Since studies conclude
that children can accept a parent's change in gender, the courts
should not deny custody to a transgender parent based upon a
misconception that a child will be unable to cope with the
change.
In resolving disputes about the custody of children, the court
system should recognize the reality of children's lives, how-
ever unusual or complex .... By failing to do so, they per-
petuate the fiction of family homogeneity at the expense of
the children whose reality does not fit this form .... [The
child's] best interest is served by exposing [the child] to real-
ity and not fostering in [the child] shame or abhorrence for [a
parent's] nontraditional commitment.350
When a child has a transgender parent, the courts must be
ready to accept that child's reality and fashion a custody ar-
rangement that addresses that child's needs without perpetuat-
ing any social bias or prejudice against transgenderism. The law
should never serve to reinforce social bias and prejudice. In-
deed, such biases are constantly in flux as social morals
change.351 As society's morals shift, so too must the law.35 2 The
law often serves to maintain a power imbalance between those
authored, or edited more than 150 professional journal articles, textbook chapters,
and books. See DALLAS DENNY, CURRENT CONCEPTS IN TRANSCENDER IDENTITY 435
(Dallas Denny ed., 1998). See also Richard Green, University of Cambridge Institute
of Criminology, at http://www.crim.cam.ac.uk/staff/RichardGreen.html.
348. Green, supra note 341.
349. See id.
350. Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31, 36 (Pa. 1992) (quoting Nancy Polikoff, This Child
Does Have Two Mothers; Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-
Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 469 (1990)).
351. See Kenneth L. Karst, Religion, Sex, and Politics: Cultural Counterrevolution in
Constitutional Perspective, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 677, 689-90 (1991) ("The law, espe-
cially the criminal law, speaks to everyone, shaping the moral order and defining
the community itself. Legislation regulating sexual morality, in other words, speci-
fies not only what conduct is permissible but also who belongs.").
352. See, e.g., Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (uphold-
ing Pennsylvania's requirement that public school teachers and students pledge al-
legiance to the flag). Three years later, the United States Supreme Court overruled
Gobitis in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding
West Virginia's requirement that students state the pledge of allegiance violated
their First Amendment rights).
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in the majority and those who are disenfranchised and marginal-
ized.353 When the disenfranchised demand social equality, the
power paradigm is threatened and the law must respond.
History is replete with examples of legal responses to
changing morals. In 1883, the United States Supreme Court up-
held the validity of anti-miscegenation laws in Pace v. State.354 In
the 1950 case Ward v. Ward, the mother was Caucasian and the
father was African-American. 355 In their divorce proceeding,
both parents sought custody of their two young daughters. Al-
though the Washington court did "not question the mother's
love for her children," 356 custody of the girls-"victims of a mixed
marriage and a broken home"357-was awarded to the father:
"They will have a much better opportunity to take their rightful
place in society if they are brought up among their own peo-
ple."358 The Washington court identified the girls as "colored"
and ignored the Caucasian heritage of their mother.35 9 This deci-
sion is hardly palatable today.
As race-based classification became increasingly unaccept-
able, the courts responded with decisions refusing to tolerate
race as a divisive factor. By 1967, contemporary moral standards
no longer regarded inter-racial marriages as "unnatural," 360 and
the United States Supreme Court invalidated all anti-
miscegenation laws. 361 Until the U.S. Supreme Court's 1984 de-
cision in Palmore v. Sidoti,362 courts frequently made custody
353. See Cox, supra note 72, at 779.
In the struggle to legally define the boundaries of social acceptance, those
who capture authority have an inherent advantage over those not in
power. Those wishing to maintain a certain boundary invoke their con-
cept of morality 'to define deviance' in ways that produce stigma, exclud-
ing people from respectable membership in the community.... This
exclusionary function of law is understood not only by those who are
stigmatized but also by those who are using the law to draw the commu-
nity's boundaries.
Id. (quoting Karst, supra note 351, at 690)
354. 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
355. 216 P.2d 755 (Wash. 1950).
356. Id. at 756.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. See id.
360. Kinney v. Virginia, 30 Gratt 858, 869 (Va. 1878) (holding that alliances be-
tween people of different races are so unnatural that God and nature seem to forbid
them).
361. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
362. 466 U.S. 429 (1984). In Palmore, the father sought custody of his three year
old child after learning that the child's mother was cohabitating with an African-
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awards based on racial factors, in which the family included bi-
racial children.363 As the United States Supreme Court stated in
Palmore:
The question, however, is whether the reality of private bi-
ases and the possible injury they might inflict are permissible
considerations for removal of an infant child from the cus-
tody of its natural mother. We have little difficulty conclud-
ing that they are not. The Constitution cannot control such
prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases
may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, di-
rectly or indirectly, give them effect. 364
Race-based classification was not always unconstitutional,
but the Supreme Court's decisions in the twentieth century be-
gan to reflect a change toward racial classifications in the right
direction regarding society's evolving attitudes about race.
Likewise, the law must be prepared to see beyond the gender
classifications of "male' and "female" and allow for the multi-
plicity of gender identification.
The Supreme Court's statement reflecting on the institu-
tional rejection of private biases is worthy of application to
transgender parents. Potential social stigmatization cannot
serve as the basis to deny custody to a transgender parent.
Transgenderism does not presumptively harm children. "Tran-
sphobia stigmatizes children."365 Transgender parents are a real-
ity for many children in the United States today. As society
raises its collective conscience of transgenderism, the courts
must follow in kind.
American man whom she later married. The Florida state court concluded that the
best interest of the child would be served by awarding custody to the father be-
cause without such a change in custody, the child would be "vulnerable to peer
pressures [and] suffer from the social stigmatization that is sure to come." The
United States Supreme Court reversed the Florida decision holding that "[t]he court
made no effort to place its holding on any other ground than race" and that a "core
purpose of the 14th Amendment was to do away with all governmentaly imposed
discrimination based on race." Id. at 431-32.
363. See generally Ward v. Ward, 216 P.2d 755, 755 (Wash. 1950). See also Potter
v. Potter, 127 N.W.2d 320 (Mich. 1964); Murphy v. Murphy, 124 A.2d 891 (Conn.
1956).
364. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433.
365. Center for Alternative Families in San Francisco: The Transgender Parent
Support Group, Transgender Parenting: Myths and Truths (Sept. 1996), at
http://mcOl.equinox.net/users/a/afp/tgpmyths.html.
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VII. CONCLUSION
A legal parent's constitutional interest in the care and cus-
tody of that parent's child is well-established law in the United
States. When parents divorce or separate, the court must bal-
ance the parents' constitutional rights with the child's best inter-
ests to determine the most beneficial custodial and visitation
arrangement. The "best interest of the child" standard is inten-
tionally broad to allow courts to exercise discretion and consider
a wide range of factors. The necessary vagueness in the stan-
dard carries the potential for abuse, as judges inject their per-
sonal moral and political agendas upon parents who do not fit
neatly into preset social and legal constructs. Transgender par-
ents who challenge traditional conceptions of sex and gender
face the private prejudices and biases of the family judges who
preside over their divorce and custody cases.
Many scholars agree that a child benefits the greatest from
continued contact with the non-custodial parent and that the
greater the degree of this contact, the more positively the child
will adapt to the post-divorce arrangement. 366 Interference by
the court's application of private biases to preclude custodial
rights to a transgender parent denies that parent's child the real-
ity of her own family and risks the "standardization" of children
that the Supreme Court warned against as early as 1925.367 As
society's awareness of gender multiplicity grows, the courts
must follow and act to recognize a transgender parent's constitu-
tional right to be a parent to his or her child. The per se preclu-
sion of child custody to a trans-parent perpetuates both
ignorance of history, science, and medical research, and margin-
alizes transgender individuals.
When the court considers the totality of circumstances af-
fecting the child's best interest, a parent's gender status should
be merely one of many factors to be balanced-not the ultimate
determinant. Application of the nexus test rather than a per se
rule against transgender parents, requires that the court find that
the parent's gender status has a negative nexus to the child's
well-being before that parent's gender status becomes relevant
to the determination of what will serve the best interest of the
child. Without such a finding to support a denial of custody or
visitation, the court effectively denies the trans-parent his or her
366. See Sexton, supra note 54, at 775-76.
367. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
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constitutional rights.
Children can and do adjust to a parent's gender change.
Gender change does not presumptively cause a child to have
gender confusion or injury. The courts must be prepared to up-
hold the constitutional rights for all individuals regardless of
gender.368 Perhaps in another twenty years, we will wonder why
we ever thought otherwise.
368. "We must learn that being a person is more important than being either
man or woman, male or female." Virginia Prince, Sex vs. Gender, Proceedings of the
Second Interdisciplinary Symposium on Gender Dysphoric Syndrome, at 23 (Don-
ald R. Laub & Patrick Gandy eds., 1973).
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